Alternative Views of Free Will and Rationality
Aristotle noted that every agent, through his actions, aims at some good, which is an end (a.k.a. telos, goal, or purpose). The chief good, specified without reference to any other good, is the final end, or final cause of that action. The rational account (logos) of a complex set of actions, agents, ends, goals, and purposes is teleology. Thus far, Aristotle’s logos of this matter seems to be straightforward; but he also held, more controversially, that nature itself is a cause that acts for a purpose and is analyzable via a natural teleology, or science of final causation in nature.
Aristotle’s immaterial and metaphysically perfect Unmoved Mover is the final cause of the motion of the heavenly spheres, which are physical enough to support the fixed stars (“fixed” because they all move in concert), but mental enough to qualify as cosmic “Intelligences.” Desiring the perfection of the Unmoved Mover, these Intelligences are motivated to execute the observed, perfectly circular motions of the fixed stars. Equivalently, one may say that the Intelligences freely choose to love the Unmoved Mover; hence, “Love makes the world go round.” Alternately one may say that the movement of the fixed stars occurs for the sake of the Unmoved Mover, which is the final cause of that celestial movement.
For Aristotle, the Unmoved Mover, as object, serves as the telos for celestial motion. As subject, the Unmoved Mover thinks about itself through all eternity, which is a tall order, since the Aristotelian universe has no temporal beginning or end. In contrast, some analysts maintain that Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover thinks about both itself and nature during its epic contemplation.
An aside: Aristotle seems to have held that if there had ever been a state of complete physical non-movement, then the passage of time would have lapsed; the universe would never have escaped the ensuing stasis; and, hence, the universe and its motion have no temporal beginning or end - - Aristotle’s universe is temporally infinite. A separate Aristotelian analysis revealed, to his satisfaction, that the universe is spatially finite.
Since Aristotle’s cosmos exists from all eternity, there is no requirement for any cause, final or otherwise, to have created it. Instead, the Aristotelian question is “What is the logical source for observed cosmic motion and order?” Aristotle’s answer is “The Unmoved Mover, which is the cosmic final cause, is a rational principle existing outside of nature (metaphorically beyond the highest heaven) but yet accounting for motion and order.” The cosmic Intelligences are both heavenly, rotating crystalline spheres in the natural order, as well as mental processes that are linked to final causes outside of nature, up to and including the Unmoved Mover. These Intelligences do the explanatory work of bridging the gap between the eternal realm of rational principles, final causes, and free will, on the one hand; and the spatial and temporal world of concrete existences, observed motions, and neurological states, etc., on the other.
While comparing abstract thought to the capacities of matter, Stephen M. Barr notes that Aristotelian thought is something more than the activity of a bodily organ. The human intellect and will are rational and immaterial (i.e., spiritual) powers. Presumably, no one would deny that if one particular, carbon-based biological organism or platform for thought (i.e., a human person) were to die, then universal reason would persist in other human persons, if they exist; in other non-carbon-based organisms, if they exist and have minds; and in pure ideas that would ricochet around a depopulated universe, if no finite rational agents were to survive.
In the hyperlink cited above, Barr reviews the book, Determined, by Robert M. Sapolsky, who gives the impression that further developments in the philosophy of thought and action are superfluous. Indeed, “neuroscience can settle the question of free will on its own.” Barr reviews the so-called Libet experiments (from the 1980’s) that seem to indicate that a characteristic brain-state (“readiness potential”) arises, presumably deterministically, before a human agent (1) becomes aware of his own decision to move a randomly selected finger and then (2) executes the chosen movement.
In contrast, Barr interprets some more recent Libet research as indicating that the “readiness potential” is not a sign of the brain actually having reached a decision. These tests on so-called “consequential choices” - - choices that involve a reason to act, rather than randomly elicited finger movement - - found no “readiness potential” preceding the awareness of choosing. If truly free will is the power to choose the good, then free will pertains to consequential choices based on reasons, rather than random choices based on indifference or spontaneity. Finally, even when a “readiness potential” exists, it is not a reliable predictor of whether the agent actually executes the chosen response.
In Barr’s view, Sapolsky has two interpretive problems in his analysis of Libet experiments: First, Sapolsky demands that true “free will” not be influenced at all by various physical factors. But such influences abound in everyday experience: Aquinas, an enthusiastic expositor of Aristotle, writes about “temperaments and dispositions” that interfere with free will. Indeed, the Bible (Matthew 26:41) identifies cases in which “the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak,” i.e., free will sometimes fails to be executed when the “flesh” (natural, unreflective passion) presents overwhelming temptations. Second, Sapolsky inverts the burden of proof in his argument: “One need not know exactly how free will works to have rational grounds for thinking one has it, any more than one needs to know exactly how vision works to believe that one is able to see.” Indeed, Sapolsky has the burden of showing that no other causes are at work if he is to prove that physical causes completely determine one’s thoughts and actions.
Barr continues by conceding that the traditional conception of free will raises deep, as-yet unresolved problems. Not knowing how free will interacts with physical brain states raises questions but does not of itself present sufficient reason to deny free will. Indeed, there are profound problems in understanding the existence of consciousness itself and how consciousness fits into the science of physical brain states. But this also does not of itself present sufficient reason to deny that consciousness exists.
Barr concludes that Sapolsky veers into an unfruitful “eliminative materialism,” which is the theory that whatever neural mechanisms cannot explain is either unreal or not sufficiently well-defined for polite, scientific conversation.
Sapolsky seems to welcome determinism on utilitarian grounds, in that determinism undermines moralizing judgment , thereby reducing the frequency of wrongful punishment. In contrast, Barr maintains that decisions - - moralizing or not - - can be influenced by reason, indicating the presence of free will. For example, mathematicians may come to new conclusions via attainment of new insights into old problems. How could the brain be open to new truths if its operation were “determined”? Long live “free will”!