Waxing and Waning Republics and Their Citizens
The democracy of ancient Athens managed, in effect, to vote itself out of existence via military misjudgments during the Peloponnesian War. The Roman Republic had a mostly unwritten tradition (constitution) of limitations upon its democratic assemblies; but the Gracchi brothers, while serving as tribunes, undermined those limitations by imposing various costly policies: Land redistribution in the country, cheap grain in the cities, shovel-ready infrastructure jobs for the unemployed, and overseas colonies for the landless. Opposition to these policies initiated a new tradition of political violence culminating in the collapse of the Roman Republic and the institution of the Roman Empire.
In the subsequent Western tradition, there is a history of kings, oligarchs, tyrants, or democratic assemblies presiding over populations of subjects, clients, persons of indefinite servitude, or citizens, etc. (This listing is not meant to be exhaustive.) To the extent that democracies and republics have track records of fairly miraculous creation and ultimate collapse, one expects any given population occasionally to transition between a more-democratic status and a less-democratic status. Indeed, an analytic industry for ranking democracies has sprung up online. In other words, democracies and republics wax and wane.
Kings, oligarchs, and tyrants typically seize power and assign populations to subordinate status. Successful democratic uprisings or constitutional conventions are relatively rare and assign populations to the status of citizen. It would seem that a relatively leisured class - - of independent means, if not of wealth - - must first exist and take the lead in forming a republic before an entire population can assume its role as citizens. Theorists typically assume that a republic is maintained in existence by all its citizens.
If, as Benjamin Franklin said, the U.S. Constitutional Convention “gave you a Republic, if you can keep it”; and if a class of independent U.S. citizens is necessary for the maintenance of the U.S. as a republic; then any factors that degrade and depopulate the class of independent U.S. citizens also undermines the Republic established among them. This is the current writer’s formulation of the concern expressed by the author Victor Davis Hanson in his excellent book, The Dying Citizen (Basic Books, 2021). In the Introduction to his book, Hanson mentions the theory of democracy as expounded by Kant in Teil I of his Die Metaphysik der Sitten. (This Part I is also known in English as The Metaphysical Elements of Justice.) This blog posting summarizes Kant’s work in this regard.
We note at once that the U.S. Constitutional Convention occurred in 1787, whereas Kant’s analyses of “perpetual peace” and “metaphysical elements of justice” appeared in 1795 and 1797, respectively. These political developments seem to have developed in parallel from a common Zeitgeist.
In Section 44 of his Metaphysical Elements, Kant states that the necessity of public lawful coercion is not empirical but rests on an a priori idea of reason, namely, that even if we imagine mankind before the institution of government to be entirely congenial and good-natured; individual men, nations, and states can never be certain of being free from future violence, because each man in a state of nature has a right to do what seems to him to be just. (Note that a nation is a group of people with some commonality of language, history, socio-economic traditions, culture, religion, place of origin, etc.; whereas a state is a group of people under a common, lawful government with coercive power.) If one wants a system of justice, then one must quit the state of nature and join in a civil society (societas civilis), i.e., a state that recognizes some things (external goods and intrinsic dignity) as one’s own. Acquisition of things and of rights are only provisional as long as there is no sanction of public law.
In Section 45 of his Metaphysical Elements, Kant further describes the state (civitas, sometimes rendered in English as civil state) as the union of a multitude of people under laws of justice. Every state contains three authorities: The sovereign authority resides in the person of the legislator; the executive authority resides in the person of the ruler (who conforms to the law); and the judicial authority resides in the person of the judge (who decides who is due what in particular cases).
In Section 46 of his Metaphysical Elements, Kant discusses the legislative authority and the citizen. The members of civil society who are united for the purpose of making laws are called citizens (cives). The citizen has three juridical attributes: First, he has the lawful freedom to obey no other law than that to which he has given his consent. Second, he is equal to all others before the law. Third, he is civilly independent, owing his existence and support, not to someone else’s arbitrary will but rather to his own rights and industry as a member of the commonwealth.
Kant thinks that “fitness for voting is a prerequisite of being a citizen.” Apprentices, servants, minors, and women - - on Kant’s view in 1797 - - are examples of dependent persons who are not themselves citizens and who do not have a right to vote, because they are not materially invested in the success of the state. People without the right to vote may be designated as “fellow comrades of the state,” but not as citizens. The presupposition seems to be that a citizen must be sufficiently muscular in order to wield the tools or war and commerce. Hence, even the most enlightened, Kantian thought endorsed the concept of “material investment” as a prerequisite for voting and citizenship.
In Section 47 of his Metaphysical Elements, Kant introduces the notion that the act by means of which the people constitute themselves as a state is the original contract. The people give up their external freedom and take it back immediately as members of a commonwealth. An individual abandons his wild, lawless freedom in order to find freedom within lawful dependency.
In the next blog posting we will summarize V. D. Hanson’s discussion of the contemporary waning of a U.S. citizenry overwhelmed by population groups once thought to be inimical to a republic: peasants, residents (as in “mere residents”), and tribes.