You Do Not Have a Right to Conflate Descriptive and Evaluative Statements
There is a metaphysical distinction between judgments of fact (what is) and judgments of value (what ought to be). Judgments of fact give rise to descriptive beliefs that have propositions as objects and that find expression in descriptive statements. Evaluative (normative) judgments give rise to evaluative beliefs that have propositions, imperatives, or personal emotive states as objects and that find expression in evaluative statements. Evaluative judgments are either moral or non-moral. Moral evaluative judgments are either deontological (fulfilling duty) or eudaimonistic (promoting the individual’s essential nature). Non-moral evaluative judgments are hypothetical (instrumental). Finally, any statement, descriptive or evaluative, expressing a belief that is justified (supported by evidence and argument) is itself said to be justified: To justify a statement means to justify its expressed belief.
As Professor Daniel DeNicola has recently noted, descriptive beliefs “aspire to truth”: It would be absurd to admit seeing a “broken” straw in a glass of soda, but yet to deny believing in the laws of optical refraction. On the other hand, most people have not had the chance to study optics; hence, “in any complex society, one has to rely on the testimony of reliable sources.” DeNicola is right in avoiding Clifford’s “stern evidentialism,” in which each person must assimilate (be prepared in principle to recite) all of the evidence that underlies each of his or her justified beliefs. In opposition to Clifford, an indigenous spear fisherman does not internalize an encyclopedia of optics before plying his craft, but rather relies on his memory of family testimony about spear fishing. Generally speaking, each person assembles some grounds for, but not all evidence pertaining to, each of his or her descriptive and evaluative beliefs from a justificatory smorgasbord including testimony, memory, perception, self-evident truths, empirical research, and discursive reasoning.
In any inquiry involving both descriptive and evaluative beliefs, each belief must be justified separately: Hume famously maintained that no “ought” may be derived from an “is.” Searle has contested the generality of Hume’s thesis. We cannot adjudicate that dispute here, but we will assume that each descriptive and evaluative belief must be justified separately.
Now what are we to make of the celebrated contemporary scoffer who asserts “I believe that the public policy prescription, X - - presented to the citizens of the sovereign country, Y, and based on policy analysis from ‘think tanks’ and international organizations, Z - - consists of a set of descriptive and evaluative statements, some of which are known to be false, unjustified, or unduly emotive”? In an abbreviated form, one might characterize the scoffer as saying “I believe that X is a hoax, that I have a personal-autonomy right to hold that belief, and that I have a free-speech right, secured by the sovereign power of Y, to promulgate that belief.”
The abbreviated characterization of the scoffer’s verbal performance creates problems by masking important details, such as whether the scoffer is referring to descriptive or evaluative statements encapsulated in X, whether some of those evaluative statements are merely emotive, whether there is an agreed acceptance of the concept of “sovereign nation,” and if so, whether the experts from Z have any business meddling in the politics of sovereign country Y. Abbreviated characterization results in a conflation of statements (and beliefs), some of which may be justified, while others only seem to attain an aura of justification by being in the rhetorical neighborhood of other statements (and beliefs) that are justified.
Let us now suppose that the scoffer directs his wrath against a particular X, defined as “Power plant P in country Y must be closed, because experts from organization Z calculate that P’s closure will mitigate global warming even while leaving the average income in Y above a specified minimum.” Let us further assume that the scoffer, although personally lacking the resources to calculate the effects of global warming or the average incomes of nations, does know that his livelihood depends on P. As a slogan or rallying cry, the scoffer may say that he “denies global warming,” but global warming per se is not the issue: X is the issue, and X contains more than descriptive statements about global ice masses and temperatures. X contains or presupposes moral and political judgments. For example, is it justified to expropriate property or income provided that those expropriated still retain more resources than the average citizen of the world’s poorest country?
By way of analogy, consider the true descriptive statement, “The U.S.S. Maine exploded and sank in Havana harbor in February of 1898.” (Whether the explosion originated from an event internal or external to the ship was never definitively established - - nor thought to be important.) At the time, there was an ongoing debate in the United States over the advisability of acquiring overseas territories. For the proponents of the soon-to-be-declared Spanish-American War, “Remember the Maine!” was a slogan bringing to mind the related descriptive statement about the Maine as a means to generate support for a war of territorial expansion. This support accrued independently of any explicit justification of evaluative statements pertaining to politics or ethics.
Now consider the true descriptive statement, “The earth is warmer in 2018 than in some previous epochs.” There is a contemporary debate regarding how many scarce economic resources should be expended today, and by whom (China, India, Europe, North America?), in order to obtain some climate benefit in the far distant future. For some in this debate, “Reduce global warming!” is a slogan evoking the related descriptive statement about earth temperatures as a means to obtain certain policy objectives without completely justifying all relevant evaluative statements.
“Remembering the Maine” or “reducing global warming” may lead to justifiable policies: In 1898, Cuba may indeed have required a new administration. In 2018, the power plant P may, regrettably, have to be closed. But in 1898, was it really justified also to acquire Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines? In 2018, is it really justified to acquiesce in the economic decline of broad swaths of entire continents?
One does not justify evaluative statements by conflating them with even the most solidly confirmed descriptive statements.