Intuition over the Centuries
The following text reviews the Aeon website article, "Philosophical intuition: just what is a priori justification?" by Professor Bruce Russell. Professor Russell teaches at Wayne State University. This review seeks to link one historical understanding of the term “intuition” to the contemporary usage outlined in Russell’s article.
In the website article Russell identifies his purpose as illuminating the notion of the justification of beliefs, whether that justification is due to introspection, sensation (or other empirical evidence, such as the reading of the output of technological devices), testimony, or memory. Since all justification depends in part on concepts, all justification also depends on the understanding of those concepts; and this latter justification is referred to as a priori justification. One of Russell’s examples of a priori justification is “2 + 2 = 4”. If one understands the concepts of addition, equality, “2”, and “4”, then one has an a priori justification for the belief that “2 + 2 = 4”. Some experience may be required for concept formation, but after that, no more experience is required for a priori justification. If the concepts in a given case constitute a proposition, then a priori justification is philosophical intuition, i.e., is based solely on the understanding of propositions, as opposed to feelings or hunches. Much time and effort may be required for the proper understanding of concepts and propositions that lead to philosophical intuition, but that time and effort is not expended in making complicated inferences. Ultimately, one “sees” or “does not see” the concepts and propositions at issue. In questions of natural science, the justification of belief is typically based on the justification of the assumptions of the non-empirical principles of induction and of inference to the best explanation. In questions of morality, the justification of belief is typically based an understanding of the concept of “wrong.” Thus, no matter how empirical a natural science might seem, and no matter how consequentialist a moral theory might appear, issues of a priori justification (philosophical intuition) inevitably occur.
The present writer approves and endorses the modern view of philosophical intuition portrayed by Russell. However, it may be of some historical interest to see how views of intuition have changed over time. Kant maintained in the Critique of Pure Reason (B15-16) that the proposition “7 + 5 = 12” is synthetic a priori, because the addition of 7 and 5 yields some number, but we know not which one unless we invoke the aid of mathematical intuition (a special case of philosophical intuition) in order to see that this number is 12. Being synthetic, the Kantian judgment “7 + 5 = 12” goes beyond understanding by concepts alone, in this case by enlisting the aid of supplementary intuition. Thus, Kantian mathematical (synthetic a priori) judgment starts with concepts, but also includes a second step of philosophical intuition in order to “see” that the sum in the example is 12. In the modern view, mathematical (a priori) judgment is based solely on the understanding of concepts and propositions, is deemed eo ipso to be philosophical intuition, and is held thereby to explain the “seeing” that the sum in the example is 12.