Plato (1): The Apology, Compared
The full title of this post is “Platonic Reflections (1): Comparison of Some Behavior in the Apology and at Disney World.”
Late last year there were media reports of some individuals surreptitiously scattering human cremation ashes on the grounds of Disney World. This scattering might be interpreted as nominally spiritual: Look at how the bereaved honor their dear departed! On the other hand, one possible post-modern interpretation of this scattering is ironic and materialistic: Look at how those insulted by death escape a day’s worth of ennui by mocking traditions of burial or cremation! In contrast, we may turn to the Platonic dialogs Apology, Crito, and Phaedo for a philosophical examination of death that is anything but ironic and materialistic. These dialogs, occurring just before and after Socrates’ execution, include a passionate investigation of the possibility and implications of a separate existence for disembodied rational souls after death. The idea of a separation of body and soul at death would later become common in Christian thought. This blog post will review the Apology; a future post will summarize Crito and Phaedo.
Before an Athenian court in 399 B.C. Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon (representing poets, politicians, and orators, respectively) accused the 70 year-old Socrates of corrupting the youth of Athens and believing in self-invented gods rather than state-approved gods. Socrates responded that their well-honed arguments sounded convincing; on the other hand, scarcely a word of what they said was true.
Socrates repeatedly complained about the short time allowed for his trial, because it was necessary for him first of all to defend himself against a widespread Athenian background belief that would prejudice jury deliberations. This belief is that Socrates is a wise man who can make the weaker argument defeat the stronger. Socrates maintains that he is said to be wise only because of a mysterious utterance of the god (oracle) at Delphi, who had supposedly once said that there is no one wiser than Socrates. (Some historians say that the oracle spoke gibberish that had to be interpreted by the Delphic priests; hence, Socrates’ uncertainty.) Socrates had set about many years ago, as a sort of religious duty, to find the true meaning of the Delphic oracle on that past occasion. It should be straightforward, Socrates thought, to find people purporting to be wise and to question them with the aim of establishing his own ignorance and inferiority. Those examined, however, neither stood up well under Socrates’ interrogation nor took kindly to his efforts; hence, there arose a widespread campaign of slander against him. Such calumny is irrelevant to the charges brought by Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon. Socrates’ “interrogation of experts” had only established that real wisdom is the property of God and that the oracle had really been saying that human wisdom has little or no value.
Socrates then returns to the specific charges of corrupting youth and believing in non-approved gods. Socrates argues (in the text indexed by Stephanus numbers 25c-26a) that if he were corrupting youth, then he would be harmed by their future corrupt behavior. But no one chooses to be harmed. Hence, he is either not corrupting youth or else is doing so unintentionally, in which case the proper remedy is private reproof, not public trial. Socrates believes that only the background hostility previously mentioned could move a jury to convict him.
Starting at 28b, Socrates asks rhetorically if he feels no compunction in having lived a life of examining others and building up animus against himself. Socrates’ rhetorical response is that if he never abandoned his military posts, ordained by Athenian commanders; then he would certainly never abandon the post that God ordained for him, that of leading the philosophical life. Socrates does not believe that God permits a better man, fulfilling a religious duty, to be harmed by a worse, such as Meletus et al. If the Athenians put Socrates to death, then they will not likely be able to find another gadfly that would arouse them to self-examination and improvement. Being now wound up in a mode of robust oratory, Socrates says things unlikely to appeal to an Athenian jury: “No man on earth who conscientiously opposes either you or any other organized democracy, and flatly prevents a great many wrongs [during public service] … can possibly escape with his life.”
Continuing at 36a, Socrates says that he is not surprised by the jury’s vote to convict him, but only by its closeness: A change of only thirty votes would have resulted in acquittal. He doubts that Meletus’ argument convinced even 20% of the jury. (Assuming equal, non-overlapping, 20% contributions from all three accusers, one might speculate that the approximate vote was 180 to convict and 120 to acquit.) Facing the death penalty, Socrates is permitted to argue for an alternative punishment. Socrates maintains that, since he spends his time persuading individual Athenians to focus on mental and moral wellbeing rather than practical advantages, the “sentence” should really be his full maintenance at state expense. To accept fines and penalties that would preserve life but prevent him from pursuing philosophy would be disobedience to his divine calling. In Socrates’ opinion, “life without this sort of examination is not worth living.
In his final address to the jury, beginning at 40a, Socrates says that he suspects that the death sentence just imposed is a blessing, i.e., that it would be a mistake to suppose that death is an evil. As represented in the Apology, death is either annihilation (dreamless sleep) or “a migration of the soul from this place to another,” where one could meet the heroes of the past, beyond the travails and malfeasance of so-called human justice. Socrates would find it especially edifying to meet others who had suffered unjust deaths, such as Palamedes (betrayed by Odysseus) and Ajax the Great (denied his just reward of Achilles’ armor). Socrates concludes that nothing can harm a good man in life or death, and that his fortunes are not a matter of indifference to the gods.
One notes that Plato presupposes the ancient Greek background belief that each living thing has a soul (psyche) of some appropriate grade. In particular, humans have rational souls. Plato also presupposes that the human soul’s “migration” (Apology, 40c) is sufficient to convey a complete person to the “other place,” where he or she can have experiences and interact with some divinities and other deceased humans (40e-41c). Plato does not address, here, whether this interaction would be limited due to the absence of some souls from the “other world” due to “reincarnation duty.” In other words the Apology, and all the other Platonic dialogs as well, are only analyzable within the ancient Greek intellectual tradition.
Based on the Apology, one infers that Socrates would have viewed the post-modern irony and detachment of human ash scattering at Disney World as inconsistent with, if not wholly repugnant to, the great seriousness with which he regarded his own divine calling, the tradition of rational inquiry.