Plato (2): Crito and Phaedo
The full title of this post is “Platonic Reflections (2): Socrates’ Final Investigations as Reported in the Dialogs Crito and Phaedo.” In Crito the argument regards the advisability of Socrates’ fleeing prison. In Phaedo there are four arguments regarding the immortality of the human soul.
One month after Socrates’ conviction, discussed in the Apology, Socrates is still alive in prison, because no executions may occur in Athens during an annual ritual voyage to and from the sacred island of Delos, celebrating Theseus’ ancient mission to kill the Minotaur on Crete. Socrates’ old friend, Crito, stops by the prison with the news that the celebratory ship will soon be in port. Of Socrates’ previous refusal to escape prison, Crito complains that he, Crito, stands to lose not only an irreplaceable friend but also his reputation as a “fixer,” whose money and connections can reliably circumvent official decrees. Crito again entreats Socrates to escape.
Upon reflection, Socrates finds that his actions should not be governed by the opinions of the many, who praise Crito for his connections; but of the few, who are expert in right and wrong (48a). Socrates establishes that to do wrong, including injury in retaliation, is bad and dishonorable (49b-c). The laws of the state are personified as complaining to Socrates and Crito that complicity in escape would tend “to destroy us, the laws, and the whole state as well” (50a-b).
The benefits of civilization, education, and tradition create obligations to obey the law. Few Athenians have benefitted from this social contract as much as Socrates, who never left the city except on military expedition (52a-b). The personified laws ask Socrates what good escaping will do. If Socrates were to flee to a well-governed state like Megara or Thebes, then the indigenous patriots would view him with suspicion. If Socrates were to flee to an ill-governed state with obtuse citizens, like Thessaly, then he would find no suitable philosophical interlocutors (53e). Leaving Athens in a dishonorable way would incur the wrath of the personified laws of the poleis in his lifetime, and of the “other world” after his death. All laws say in effect, “Do not take Crito’s advice, but follow ours” (54c-d). Having no rational response to Socrates’ argument, Crito reluctantly acquiesces in Socrates’ decision not to escape.
Turning now to Phaedo’s recapitulation, in the eponymous dialog, of the events and arguments of Socrates’ final day before execution, the interlocutors Cebes and Simmias object (62c-63a) to Socrates’ easy acceptance of his death penalty: If the philosopher’s service in life is directed by the gods, who are the best masters, why should a really wise man wish readily to accept death and to desert masters who are better than himself? Socrates undertakes (63b) to provide a better defense of his philosophizing than he did at his trial. He defines death as the release of the soul from the body (64c). He argues (65b-69e) that the soul attains a true view of reality by reflection; that the presence of the body only blurs this view; that the “other world” will be adequately populated by good rulers and good friends (potential interlocutors); and, hence, that the true philosopher looks forward to death. Cebes objects (69e-70b) that Socrates has only presupposed that the soul will survive death and arrive in the “other world” while retaining its “active force and intelligence.” Cebes demands an argument for the immortality of the soul to support the thesis that the true philosopher looks forward to death. Socrates then presents four such arguments, as follows.
The Dynamic-Equilibrium Argument (70c-72e): It is proposed that for all things in some class of continuously varying things, each thing comes into being from a differing, “opposite” state. Consider the case of exactly two differing size states, “large” and “small.” Today, one might say: There are dynamic processes (with transition rates) connecting these two states in both directions, i.e., from small to large and from large to small. In dynamic equilibrium, there are equilibrium populations (call them P1 and P2) of “smalls” and “larges” related to the transition rates (call them R12 and R21) by the equation P1*R12 = P2*R21. If both transition rates are positive and one population is a positive integer, then we may infer that the other population, even if not observed, is a positive integer.
If life and death were “opposites” in the same sense as the two states “large” and “small”, then since both birth rate and death rate are positive, and since there is a positive number of souls in the present world, then there must be a positive number of souls in “the other world.” The sum over worlds of all souls is constant; the soul is immortal. Comment: Life and death do not seem to belong to a class of things that are continuously varying. (Being “half alive” under some duress is a metaphor.) If life and death and are not “opposites” in the same sense as “large” and “small”, then this argument seems to rely on an equivocation on the term “opposite.”
The Recollection Argument (72e-77a): Measured things may appear equal at one resolution and unequal at a higher resolution. Nevertheless, we have a notion of absolute equality. Seeing deficient examples of “equality” merely helps us to recollect the notion of equality itself. Such recollection presupposes, in turn, prior knowledge of the equal itself. Since this knowledge does not come from sense perception, we (i.e., our souls) must have acquired this knowledge before we started processing sense perception. Hence, our souls must have existed before we were born. Comment: This argument, by itself, does not completely address the immortality of the soul; because each person could have a “one-use soul” that pre-dates and animates his or her specific body and that then perishes.
The Metaphysical Classification Argument (78b-84b): If there is a metaphysical classification of existent things into two groups (worlds) based on certain clearly recognizable features, then perhaps we can infer which of the two groups “would naturally suffer the fate of being dispersed” (78b), i.e. the fate of being mortal. The two groups in question are the composite and the incomposite (simple). The composite refers to the perceptible things (in the “visible world”) that are ever changing; and that are natural, unintelligible, and mortal. The simple refers to the invisible world (of the Forms) that allows only mental access; that is always the same; and that is divine, intelligible, and immortal (78c-79a, summarized in 80b).
The soul is more like the things in the simple world, whereas the body is more like the things in the composite world (79b-e). Therefore, supposing a soul has been freed of bodily influence (“purified”) through abstemious philosophical training; that soul is most likely to wend its way, post death, to the simple, invisible “other world” (80d-82c) without fear of “scattering” into oblivion (84b). Comment: One might say that the soul, being simple, has no decay by-products and is hence incapable of decay.
The fourth argument in 105c-e does not mention the Forms explicitly, so we will refer to it as The Linguistic Argument (based on analysis of concepts): Soul must be present in a body to make it alive, i.e. whenever soul takes possession of a body, the soul always brings life with it. Death, the soul leaving the body, is the opposite of life. But while so leaving, the soul itself does not change and “will never admit the opposite of that which accompanies it.” Hence, soul is immortal. Comment: The idea seems to be that a soul may be dislodged from a body, and if so, the body dies; but the soul itself carries on its own existence.
After Socrates finishes his final argument for the immortality of the soul, Simmias claims to have no doubts about Socrates’ bravura performance. Nevertheless, Simmias wisely hedges his bets by saying “all the same, the subject is so vast, and I have such a poor opinion of our weak human nature, that I can’t help still feeling some misgivings” (107a-b). Comment: In the Christian tradition such misgivings are allayed by the resources of revelation in addition to those of rational inquiry.