Kant's Political Theory (2): Determinative Articles

The full subtitle for this posting is “Three Determinative Articles en route to the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace.”  This posting is the second of three installments reviewing Kant’s Toward Perpetual Peace, A Philosophical Sketch (1795).

In the subsection on his first determinative article (rational principle) for perpetual peace, Kant stated his taxonomy of political organization: A state can be classified according to its form of sovereignty (autocratic, aristocratic, or democratic) or according to its form of government (republican or despotic).  In a republic, the legislative assembly is representative and is separated from the executive power of the ruler, whereas a despot both makes and executes the laws.  Kant believed that, except possibly in some cases of violent revolution, democratic sovereignty leads to despotic government by founding an executive power of a small committee over a large community.  Democratic republics are, for Kant, an unlikely species.  In contrast, monarchical or aristocratic sovereignty offers the possibility of gradual legal reform culminating in republican government.  After all, the Prussian King Frederick II supposedly said that he was merely the highest-ranking servant of the state.

Kant’s first determinative article is: The civil constitution of every state, i.e., its form of government, is to be republican.  Kant thinks that only republican constitutions are consistent with the idea of the original contract (individuals giving up some natural rights to a ruler, who enforces peace) and its basic principles of freedom, equality, and dependence upon a single legislative source.  The republican constitution has favorable prospects for creating perpetual peace, because a republic’s citizens must vote to adopt the costs of warfare; whereas a despotism’s subjects have no voice in authorizing the dreadful tasks of financing, fighting, and dying in a war.

Each individual’s juridical equality is the right to be constrained only to the extent that others are so constrained.  Each individual’s juridical freedom is the authority or power to obey only those laws to which he either has consented or could have consented, either freely or under threat of “being thrown out of the neighborhood” (see the first blog post in this series).  Focusing now on the question of “has consented” versus “could have consented,” we see in Kant’s first footnote in his subsection on the first determinative article that “Rechtliche Freiheit … ist die Befugnis, keinen äuβeren Gesetzen zu gehorchen, als zu denen ich meine Beistimmung habe geben können.”  In the indicative mood, therefore, obedience is limited to laws “to which I have been able [in fact] to give my consent.”  In the subjunctive mood, however, obedience is limited to laws “to which I could have given my consent [even if I did not actually consent].”  Only Kant knew whether he meant to use the indicative or subjunctive mood when he wrote that sentence.  Either way, it seems clear that the original contract is not one occurrence in the past, but is rather the cumulative effect of a period of negotiation, force, and agreement.  

Kant’s second determinative article for perpetual peace is: International law is to be founded on a federation of free states.  Peoples (Völker), to the extent that they are civilized enough to form nation-states (Staaten), can be evaluated like individual human beings.  Each nation-state that can potentially be injured by other nation-states due to their mere proximity can and should demand from its neighbors that they all enter into a higher-order constitution analogous to that of the constitution for individuals within one nation-state.  Such a higher-order constitution must form a league of nations (Völkerbund) but not a higher-order state consisting of blended peoples (Völkerstaat).  (In his Universal History of 1784, Kant had written of a Staatsverbindung as that which is opposed to a league of nations.  See the March 1, 2019 blog posting.)

Each nation-state contains its own relationship between its lawgiving class and its Volk (be they citizens or subjects), which results in the nation-state’s persisting identity.  In effect, Kant adopted an early version of identity politics by saying that nation-states should not be melded or fused together in a higher-order nation-state (nicht in einem Staat zusammenschmelzen sollen).  Thus, Kant speaks of his league of nations as a federation of free states.

One should think, Kant writes, that civilized peoples, each of which has already united into a nation-state, would hurry to exit an international system of crudeness, boorishness, animal-like degradation, and warfare in favor of the constitutional order of a league of nations.  Until now, however, this has been prevented by each nation-state’s view that its own majesty consists precisely in its own independence, i.e., in the fact that there is no other nation-state that can subject it to external legal compulsion.  Live free or die.  European and American savages differ only in that the latter eat their enemies while the former exploit them more efficiently.

The idea of federation is practical, Kant thinks, because if fortune should direct one powerful and enlightened people to form a republic (the form of government best positioned to ensure perpetual peace), then this fact would act as a nucleating point that incentivizes other nation-states eventually to join it in a league of nations.

Reason, by itself, presents nation-states with no other way to exit the lawless condition that contains nothing but warfare: Give up wild, lawless freedom; get used to public legal compulsion; and join in a continuously growing, higher-order state consisting of blended peoples.  In its purest form, this would be a world republic (Weltrepublik).  But to the extent that the counsel of reason is rejected by existing nation-states with their precious notions of independence and majesty, only a surrogate remains, viz., a league of nations.

Kant’s third determinative article for perpetual peace is: The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.  The limitation is that we are not dealing with a Gastrecht (guest law, which would serve as a basis for a foreigner [Fremdling] to claim the status of a temporary “housemate” (Hausgenosse, co-resident, or, presumably, legal resident]), but rather with a Besuchsrecht (visitation law, which is a basis for any foreigner to seek a temporary level of hospitality).  Hospitality is the right of an individual, upon his arrival in a country not his own, not to be treated in a hostile fashion during a temporary period of probation, after which he may be turned away if this would not result in his demise.  In this manner (by recognizing visitation law) remote parts of the world can come into mutually peaceful relationships that eventually become public law and so bring the human race ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution.  

Compared to such peaceful, cosmopolitan relationships, Kant views the inhospitable behavior of the civilized, preeminently commercial European states in oppressing the indigenous peoples of America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Spice Islands, and Southern Africa as injustice approaching terror.  In this regard Kant speaks of “the litany of all evil” (die Litanei aller Übel).  At least the more developed societies of the Far East have shown more resistance to European “visitors.”

The idea of cosmopolitan law (Weltbürgerrecht) is not a fanciful or outrageous form of imaginary rights, but is rather a necessary completion (in the form of an unwritten code) pertaining both to civil law (Staatsrecht) and to international law (Völkerrecht) and culminating in public human law in general (öffentlichen Menschenrechte überhaupt or “human rights”), and hence, in perpetual peace.

In conclusion, Kant deferred to no one in harshly criticizing existing European empires; but with his pure, a priori principle in his Universal History that “the natural capacities of rational beings will eventually be developed,” he called for an abstract cosmopolitan utopia that amounted to an empire of sorts.  Likewise, with his purest form of political contract theory in his Perpetual Peace, he called for a single, continuously growing, transnational state consisting of blended peoples in a world republic. Thus, at different times Kant aspired to a utopian imperialism and then to a utopian, transnational world republic.  He seems ultimately to have realized that the utopian empire and the utopian world republic would forever remain nowhere in the real world.  Kant held out hope, however, that his backup plan, a league of nations, would eventually stop warfare.  

Was Kant an Imperialist?

Today, in 2019, one can well imagine the state of profound perplexity arising in well-meaning bureaucrats of the European Union, who see great resistance to their supra-national rule in the phenomena of the Brexit revolt in Great Britain and the immigration-policy mutiny in Italy, Hungary, and elsewhere.  In order to understand this opposition to supra-national rule, one would do well to consult the “continuous coastline of experience” available to Immanuel Kant himself.  Why did Kant seemingly come to the conclusion that supra-national rule would lead to rational, enlightened, and progressive government?  Would it be fair to call the Kantian political vision imperialist?

In 1784, the 60-year-old Kant must also have experienced profound perplexity while surveying the lack of political progress during his own lifetime in the supposedly enlightened and progressive eighteenth century.  Instead of widespread peace, prosperity, and human flourishing he could only see dozens of actual or threatened wars, including the British-Spanish War (1727-29); the War of the Polish Succession (1733-38); the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48); the Seven-Years’ War (1756-63), which was a true “world war” among all European states and their colonies; the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778-79); and most recently, the American Revolutionary War (1775-83).  These wars were facilitated by an ever more efficient European bureaucracy and taxing power, leading to burgeoning standing armies.  

In his day, Kant could observe competing Weltreiche (world empires) existing in such concrete varieties as British, French, Dutch, Danish, Spanish, and Portuguese.  In contrast, his conception of a unitary rational political order was expressed as an abstract, weltbürgerlichen Zustand [citizen-of-the-world (cosmopolitan) condition]; which, if it could be brought into existence, would render the terms “imperial” or “kaiserlich” obsolete.  [Linguistic note: Zustand can refer to the state of an atom (excited or ground), the phase of a chemical (solid, liquid, or vapor), or the condition of a thing (the seaworthiness of the Yorktown).]

During the 1780’s Kant was working toward the view that everything in nature works according to laws, but that only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his idea of law.  In order to overcome competing, non-rational inclinations, reason also provides a certain feeling, interest, or reverence that motivates the performance of duty.  Such reverence is “caused within the self” (selbstgewirkt) by a concept of reason.  The rational being exercises a free will, not because his actions are lawless but because they are autonomous, i.e., follow self-prescribed, “internal laws.” [See page 79 in the book An Initial View of Final Causes, described elsewhere on this web site.]

Kant published his Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose in 1784.  He noted that the lawful behavior of everything in nature also implies that individual agents and nations alike are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature or providence.  Kant maintained that it is possible to discover a purpose in nature behind the seemingly senseless course of human political events.  He enunciated nine propositions that would underlie such a purposive universal history.

Propositions 1 – 3: The natural capacities of rational beings will be developed completely in the long run, including political capacities that can only appear in the species, not in the individual.  Nature gave mankind reason and freedom of the will, facilitating progress in some individuals in some societies at some times from barbarism to technological development, to refinement of thought, and ultimately to true happiness and self-esteem.  Regrettably, however, nature does not seem to have been as concerned that man should live in agreeable political circumstances.  The species of rational beings - - which Kant considered to be immortal - - is meant to develop its capacities over long durations of time that far exceed the lifetime of any one individual.  

Propositions 4 – 6: Antagonism between individuals within society is the long-run cause of a law-governed social order.  The desire for honor, power, and property drives individuals to seek status in society and to progress from individual barbarism to culture, enlightenment, and basic political development.  Next, the theoretical problem arises of how to attain a perfectly just civil constitution, i.e., the framework for a government that administers universal justice and maintains the highest level of mutually non-interfering freedoms.  The well-governed civil society maintains freedom under its duly enacted “external laws” combined with irresistible police and military forces.  “Man is an animal that needs a master,” because he is misled by his self-seeking inclinations.  Where, however, can such a master (supreme authority) be found?  Kant thought that human beings always turn out to be unjust supreme authorities; hence, a perfect solution to this political problem is impossible.

Proposition 7: The challenge of establishing a perfect civil constitution is paralleled by the problem of establishing a law-governed external relationship with other states.  Antagonism between individuals is mirrored by the wars, devastations, upheavals, and exhaustion of nation-states, which constantly scheme to expand their borders and oppress their citizens.  Kant suggests that a Völkerbund (union or federation of peoples) would induce states and individuals alike to renounce their brutish freedoms and to seek security within a single, law-governed constitution.  Such renunciation would give rise to “a cosmopolitan condition of public political security” (einen weltbürgerlichen Zustand der öffentlichen Staatssicherheit).  As it is, mankind must endure great evils for the sake of illusory national advantages until it finally attains moral maturity and a union of states (Staatenverbindung).  Kant believed that “we [Europeans] are still a long way from the point where we could consider ourselves morally mature.” 

Proposition 8: The history of the human race reveals nature’s hidden plan to bring about a perfect political constitution over a long period of time and despite many human follies and caprices.  Human enlightenment and perfected natural capacities will eventually arise.  War itself will come to be seen as an artificial, and hence unjustified, undertaking; replete with dubious risks and overwhelming national debts; and ruinous of international trade and prosperity.  To counter these ill effects, Kant notes that some states are already offering themselves, albeit without any legal authority, as arbiters of disputes.  Such ad hoc diplomatic initiatives seem to presage the future existence of a great supra-national political body: The “highest purpose of nature, a universal cosmopolitan condition / state / phase (ein allgemeiner weltbürgerlicher Zustand) … will at last be realized.”

Proposition 9: Kant notes that it is indeed a strange idea to propose writing a universal history of how world events must unfold if they are to conform to rational, cosmopolitan ends and to display “a regular process of improvement in the political constitution of our [European] continent (which will probably one day provide laws for all other continents).” In contrast to Kant’s foreseen universal history, empirical history accumulates masses of detail that will be lost or misunderstood in the long run.  Hence, Kant believes that it is only universal history that will be treasured by readers in the distant future; because it is only universal history that portrays the political points of view, achievements, and failures that relate to the pursuit of cosmopolitan purpose, which is unitary, rational, and abstract.

One concludes that, based on his 1784 Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, Kant was not an imperialist in the sense of advocating one or more world empires of the type existing in his day.  He could only be faulted for his principle that “the natural capacities of rational beings will be developed completely in the long run,” which seems to be empirically and decisively contradicted by the failure of all attempts to instantiate an abstract, cosmopolitan political system.  At some point, extending “the long run” to “an even longer run” loses its appeal.  In any possible world, it seems that only a system of national states, of varying quality, exists as an imperfect substitute for Kant’s utopian vision, which is an “imperialism of ‘no-place’.”