Timelessness, Natural Law, and Natural Religion
In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant notes that all rational knowledge (Vernunfterkenntnis) is either material (concerned with determinant objects, either of nature or of freedom) or formal (concerned with the form of understanding and reason themselves). Philosophy, the study of all rational knowledge, is hence divided into physics (natural philosophy), ethics (moral philosophy), and logic, respectively. All knowledge that lacks any empirical component is “pure,” or a priori. Logic, being formal, is pure. In contrast, physics and ethics have both empirical and non-empirical (metaphysical) components, giving rise to the metaphysics of nature and of morals, respectively.
In the Groundwork, Kant relegates the empirical part of ethics to practical anthropology, proposing instead to investigate the metaphysics of morals (Metaphysik der Sitten, sometimes abbreviated as Moral) in order to explain the absolute necessity carried by moral laws. For example, “‘Thou shalt not lie,’ could not hold merely for mankind (Menschen), other rational beings (andere vernünftige Wesen) having no obligation to abide by it … the ground of obligation must be looked for … solely a priori in the concepts of pure reason.” Practical rules in current worldly circumstances can never be absolute moral laws. What is absolute is that one ought never to act except in such a way that he or she can also will that his or her subjective maxim becomes a universal law.
A precept is a guiding principle or rule that is used to control, influence or regulate the conduct of an agent. (In this discussion, “precept” is equivalent to “moral precept,” as opposed to some relatively minor point of etiquette or to some matter of belief or doctrine not necessarily tied to conduct.) Those precepts, if any, having royal or divine origins are referred to as commandments, because of their authoritative source (variously described as worthy of respect, overpowering, or awe-inspiring): The commandment-giver is capable of meting out extremes of reward or punishment to agents following or violating the commandment. Those precepts, if any, arising autonomously within each rational agent (due to rationality per se) Kant refers to as categorical imperatives, which are considered to be likewise worthy of respect (Achtung). Of course, it is not clear that a rational agent, other than Kant himself, would reliably experience enough Achtung in order to avoid occasional backsliding.
For Kant, moral precepts and rationality itself (the a priori concepts of pure reason and the categories of the understanding) are logically prior to empirical phenomena and, as such, are timeless and uncreated. In contrast, the Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204 C.E.) maintained that moral precepts originate simultaneously with the creation of humankind. On this view, moral precepts were created after “five days’ worth” of creation had already occurred; i.e., moral precepts are created in time, albeit it in undocumented (i.e., unrecorded or prehistoric) time.
In the context of Maimonides’ theory, moral precepts are referred to as elements of natural law. (See David Novak, “Does Natural Law Need Theology?” in First Things, November 2019.) Subsequently to the inception of natural law, various human civilizations got around to writing down moral codes with varying degrees of success. Regarding the motivation for individuals to adhere to moral precepts, Kant emphasizes respect (Achtung) for the timeless moral law and the autonomy of rational agents; whereas Maimonides emphasizes ingrained deference to (or fear of) a timeless, divine authority that also makes appearances in time.
Recapitulating the natural-law theory, one might say that there is one creation event for the physical universe, including the time axis itself; followed by, in prehistoric time, the creation of humankind and the natural (moral) law itself; followed by, in historic time, the writing up of moral codes in various cultures. In this theory, one must avoid equivocation on the term “creation” (of the physical universe, of humankind, or of civilizations); on the term “prehistoric” (after a creation event but before the origin of mankind versus after the origin of mankind but before documented history); and on the term “natural law” (in physics or in ethics).
In at least one respect, Maimonides’ natural-law analysis has an advantage over Kant’s timeless-precept approach: Maimonides can explain why God held Cain immediately responsible for Abel’s death in prehistoric time, even though the written norm against murder would not be given until much later at Mt. Sinai. According to Maimonides, the precept against murder already existed in Cain’s day and was, or should have been, ingrained (non-inferentially) in Cain’s conscience. In contrast, it would seem to have been too onerous a Kantian requirement to expect that Cain should have been able to perform the world’s first “universalization of subjective maxim” (a particular kind of inference) in order to ascertain de novo that murder is illicit.
Kant’s impressive account of the timeless source of moral obligation implies that moral reasoning is available to all rational agents in a secular universe. This reasoning is based on the universalization of subjective maxims and is analogous to the Biblical account of the “Golden Rule.” In contrast, for Maimonides, natural law seems to appear in time in a way that is only accidentally amenable to mankind’s rational faculties and that could elude the faculties of hypothetical rational agents on a distant exoplanet.
The concept of timelessness has served Kant less well in religion. Kant seems to have implied that all revealed religions overlap a common domain representing a unique, timeless natural religion of reason (Vernunftreligion), which exists as an aid in motivating moral choices and as a part of the domain of pure reason. (See the October 2019 posting to this blog.) This natural religion of reason, if it exists, is available to all introspective, rational agents. But as a matter of historical record among the world’s revealed religions, it seems never to have occurred to any of the leaders of the non-Christian religions that there is any such real overlap. Instead, this purported “natural religion of overlap” seems to be a watered-down version of Christianity that is credible only to some Deistic or Enlightenment thinkers in the West, or to their intellectual successors.
Kant’s timeless view of Vernunftreligion led him to some views that are distinctly unorthodox from the Christian perspective: While quoting from a minor Kantian text, T. M. Greene notes on p. LIX of his Introduction to Kant’s Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (Harper, 1960) that Kant considered resurrection to be unimportant, “for who is so fond of his body that he would wish to drag it about with him through all eternity if he could get by without it?” It would seem to be more appropriate to say that religion has both transcendent (timeless) and immanent (historical) aspects.