Status of Citizens on Constitution Day, 2022

This essay is the third in a trio of blog-postings (8/1/22, 9/1/22, and 9/17/22) analyzing the waxing and waning of historical republics, as has been discussed in Victor Davis Hanson’s outstanding book, The Dying Citizen (Basic Books, 2021).  A republic presupposes citizens, as opposed to individuals existing in a state of nature or as the subjects of an autocracy or oligarchy.  This year’s Constitution Day (September 17, 2022) marks 235 years since the signing, in Philadelphia, of the U.S. Constitution prior to its adoption by the states and its establishment of the U.S. as a republic of citizens.

Before the institution of a republic, Hanson considers individuals to be “pre-citizens.”  In the immediately preceding (9/1/22) blog post, we looked at one type of pre-citizen, the peasant.  In today’s blog post, we examine two additional concepts of pre-citizen: the resident and the tribe member.  We will conclude with an estimate of the status of U.S. citizens on Constitution Day, 2022.

Citizens are members of a civil society who are united for the purpose of forming a republic and making laws.  Following Kant, we observe that the citizen has three characteristics: the lawful freedom to obey no other law than that to which he has given his consent; equality with all others before the law; and economic autonomy, or the responsibility for one’s own support as a member of the commonwealth (republic).  Whether in a constitutional convention or as an accumulation of precedent, the people constitute themselves as a state with coercive power in an original contract.  The people thereby give up their external freedom and take it back immediately as members of a republic.

Residents are merely those who live in a particular place, whereas citizens are individuals who have legal rights and duties even if they temporarily live outside the republic granting them citizenship.  Historically, as Hanson writes in his Chapter Two, immigrants arriving in the U.S. were expected to surrender their previous identities (e.g., to forego acting as foreign agents, etc.) and to adopt an American identity out of gratitude for the rights conveyed by the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution (i.e., to adopt American values as delineated in the republic’s founding documents).  The existence of this gratitude or adopted set of values - - in a word, this assimilation - - was freely presupposed, for why else would new immigrants have undertaken the arduous journeys required in previous centuries?

New immigrants to the U.S., it was originally thought, had no more reason than anyone else to create factions within the U.S.; in any event, the U.S. was governed by checks and balances countering potential factions.  Eventually, the legal differences between citizens and various types of aliens (from the Latin alienus, meaning foreigner, stranger, or belonging to another country or people) were established in U.S. law; and the U.S. became the world’s oldest functioning constitutional republic of citizens.

Today, Hanson observes, social cohesion (assimilation of immigrants) in the U.S. is challenged by the huge numbers of impoverished, illegal aliens arriving in the U.S. without high school diplomas, fluency in English, or the incentive to assimilate.  It would seem that there is a progressive elite in the U.S. that encourages non-assimilation in order to cultivate a dependent class of clients and future voters.  Hanson offers a flagrant example of such encouragement of non-assimilation on his page 71: In a recent U.S. Presidential primary election, a certain non-Spanish-speaking, third-generation American candidate, who holds a Stanford degree, appealed for pollical support from non-assimilated individuals from Mexico and Latin America.  These non-assimilated individuals were presumably thrilled by that candidate’s consistent use of trilled r’s and of Spanish pronunciations for the buzz-words of identity politics.  Hanson finds (page 75) that huge numbers of immigrants arise from an open-border policy that is consistent with corporate America’s desire for cheap labor and with many politicians’ desires for client-voters.

On his pages 96-97, Hanson finds that open borders are being accepted in popular media and elite institutions as a universal right to emigrate anywhere in the world.  Thus, “we are reverting to the world of the pre-citizen and to a pre-nation mindset,” which is reminiscent of “the latter fifth century AD, when Vandals, Visigoths, Ostrogoths, and Huns freely crossed into Roman lands.”  The U.S. Constitution does not guarantee anyone such a right, and this immense immigration “suggests that citizenship, as defined by the Constitution, in some ways no longer really exists.”

Tribalism, the subject of Hanson’s Chapter Three, is the theory that the divisions of a traditional society are based primarily on kin groups (sets of individuals with blood ties) and their chieftains.  The word tribe derives from the Latin for “three-fold,” referring to the tradition that there were originally three tribes in the Roman state before the advent of one unified citizenry in the Roman Republic.  As Hanson remarks on his page 100, “Rome gave us the word natio (nation) to reflect the revolutionary idea that the free citizens of a state did not all have to look the same way … [in order] to enjoy the same rights.”  In other words, the Roman Republic rejected tribalism.

Likewise, American multiracialism envisions one unified citizenry within the U.S., with one common culture existing in any number of races.  The U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1788, provided for the abolition of the foreign slave trade after 20 years, as well for the infamous “3/5 compromise,” which were necessary both for the unanimous adoption of the Constitution and for the establishment of the former colonies’ common defense.  (Like clockwork, in 1808 Jefferson signed enabling legislation outlawing the foreign slave trade.)  In other words, the U.S. Constitution aims at the ideal of a non-racial citizenship.

Today, however, a new competitor, multiculturalism, is at war with traditional American multiracialism.  Multiculturalism seeks to define the country by many cultures, some of which are mutually antagonistic; and envisions a continual feuding of various races, sects, tribes, and identities for hegemony in an existential fight to control culture and government.

Tribalism, now seen as essentially synonymous with multiculturalism, was until recently regarded as backward, reactionary, and pre-civilizational, marking a road to chaos (Hanson, p. 101).  Examples of disastrous tribalism appear in the Jim-Crow South, the castes of India, the racial laws of fascist states, the apartheid of South Africa, and the warring regions of the former Yugoslavia.

Earlier, Thucydides had argued that tribal people were inherently nomadic and incapable of civilization.  In contrast, the Greek polis replaced blood ties with the offer of rights and duties for citizens.  Various republics waxed and waned over time, yet tribalism never went wholly extinct.  Tribalism has now reappeared as the preferred progressive tool for identification of individuals by race and gender.  Hanson notes (p. 108) that in the 1950’s American campus housing was segregated by race, that in the 1960’s such segregation was banned, but that by the 2020’s segregated living quarters and “safe spaces” have become trendy again.  Multiculturalism is eclipsing multiracialism.

Why, Hanson asks (p. 115), has the theory of race and gender victimization overtaken the Marxist doctrine of class oppression as the main revolutionary creed?  One might speculate that the class of the poor, typically defined as the lowest-income 20% of the U.S. population, is smaller than the class of non-whites, which is around 40% of the U.S. population.  Moreover, upward and downward mobility ensures that the lowest-income 20% are not the same individuals year after year, whereas ethnicity is presumably a fixed characteristic.  Hence, some politicians would expect to find at least twice as many clients if race and gender are the defining categories of victimization instead of income level.

“Marginalized groups” are defined as sets of individuals supposedly victimized today due to the behavior of some others’ ancestors in the remote past.  Multiculturalism, or tribalism, results in individuals within “marginalized groups” now being treated unequally (preferentially) at the expense of individuals within officially non-marginalized groups in a perverse, Orwellian rendition of equality and fairness.  For example, Hanson points out (pp. 131-132) that the “chief diversity and inclusion officer” in a major city fired a prominent, white city employee in 2017 on the basis of race, because it was deemed necessary to “uplift our identities and our separate ethnicities in order to instill a sense of pride and community and support for one another.”  Thus, we see that tribalism is a way to give social preferences to individuals based on superficial appearance rather than on merit or the legal treatment of citizens.

Conclusion: Throughout history, republics have waxed and waned (see the 8/1/22 blog posting).  The U.S. Republic and its citizens are now under duress, based on three metrics that Hanson has presented: First, a bimodal distribution of peasants and masters has largely replaced an economically autonomous middle class via unfair trade and ruinous debt (see the 9/1/22 blog posting).  Second, open borders, combined with patron-politicians and client-voters, have replaced the ideal of assimilated citizens with the fact of “mere residents.”  Third, a retribalization of society has occurred, in which superficial appearance has largely replaced merit and the legal rights of citizens.  Based upon this evidence, it would seem (to the current reviewer) that the prognosis for U.S. citizens and their republic on this Constitution Day is for a future that is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” as its ruling class attempts to retain power.  There is always the possibility, however, that U.S. citizens might discover a previously unknown, modern-day Horatius at their bridge into the future, a Horatius who might ward off attackers and prolong the tenuous existence of the U.S. Republic.

The Peasant as a Type of Pre-Citizen

One month ago on this website, we began a discussion of the historical waxing and waning of republics, which is the subject of Victor Davis Hanson’s excellent book, The Dying Citizen (Basic Books, 2021).  Hanson references Kantian political theory before proceeding to focus on U.S. citizens.  

Section 46 of Kant’s Metaphysical Elements of Justice [Metaphysische Anfangsgruende der Rechtslehre], which is a subset of his Metaphysics of Morals [Die Metaphysik der Sitten], defines citizens as the members of civil society who are united for the purpose of forming a republic and making laws.  The citizen has three characteristics: the lawful freedom to obey no other law than that to which he has given his consent; equality with all others before the law; and civil independence, or the responsibility for the provision of his own support as a member of the commonwealth.  Proceeding from the presupposition that a citizen must be sufficiently muscular in order to wield the tools of war and commerce, thereby becoming “materially invested” in the success of the state; Kant finds that people such as apprentices, servants, minors, and women, etc., may be designated as “fellow comrades of the state,” but not as voters or citizens - - at least not in the year 1797.

It is to be emphasized that there are three basic characteristics of a Kantian citizen: freedom to choose one’s republic and vote for its laws, equality before the law, and economic autonomy.

In Section 47 of his Metaphysical Elements, Kant introduces the notion that the act by means of which the people constitute themselves as a state (a civil society with coercive power) is the original contract.  (One assumes that “the people constituting themselves” may be a one-time constitutional convention, an accumulation of historical precedents, or some combination thereof.)  The people give up their external freedom and take it back immediately as members of a commonwealth (republic).  An individual, as a “pre-citizen,” abandons his wild, lawless freedom (the Hobbesian “perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death”) in order to find his freedom as a law-abiding citizen.  

One notes here a certain, ever-present danger of equivocation on the term “pre-citizen.”  First, that term may refer to hypothetical or quasi-mythical individuals lost in the mists of time, some of whom are said to have participated in a legendary constitutional convention or to have memorialized certain political precedents.  Alternately, that term may refer to a definite population from which were drawn certain known individuals who participated in an actual constitutional convention.  Finally, that term may refer to contemporary, erstwhile citizens who have lost their previously inalienable rights due to a revolution against a previously established republic.

According to Hanson, there are three types of pre-citizens: peasants, “mere residents,” and tribes.  Today, the concept of peasant focuses primarily not on an originally agrarian type of work, but rather on an abject subservience and lack of upward mobility.  In the third blog posting in this series (8/1/22, 9/1/22, and 9/17/22), the concepts of “mere residents” (individuals purporting to have the rights of citizenship without the corresponding duties) and of tribes (individuals purporting to have social preferences based on superficial appearance rather than on legal merit) will be discussed.

In the Kantian analysis of citizenship, it would seem to follow that if the constitution of a republic is corrupted by physical violence or by an Orwellian redefinition of terms; then erstwhile citizens will be divided de facto into one or another of two new classes: either a newly subjugated, non-free, unequal, and dependent class of “pre-citizens,” analogous to the “head count” of ancient Rome and sorely in need of a new constitutional convention; or a newly privileged ruling class of “post-citizens,” by which is meant a class of overlords who rule as unelected bureaucrats, evolving-document theorists, and economic globalists.

The thesis has often been advanced that a republic and its citizens depend on the existence of a middle class that can moderate some occasional political storms.  (Hanson notes on his pages 22-23 that this idea dates back to the ancient Greeks, who doubted the reliability of the poor, who could not afford weapons; as well as the zeal of the rich, who were too indolent to defend their polis.)  Failing such a middle-class defense, a republic can easily bifurcate into a new class of contemporary pre-citizens who lose the enforceability of their rights, however recently deemed to have been inalienable; and into a new class of post-citizens who gain overlordship via purported expertise in public administration, in flexible legal interpretation, and in beneficent economic redistribution.  

Kant’s third criterion for citizenship, namely, that citizens be civilly independent (economically autonomous) is violated in case the middle class does not have the material resources to resist encroachments against its freedoms.  If a middle class sees declining economic circumstances and ruinous debt (think: unfair trade and trillions of dollars of student-loan debt); then the corresponding republic wanes, its citizens move away and/or die off, and a bimodal distribution of peasants and masters arises.  In this case, Hanson writes on his page 15, “the function of government is not to ensure liberty but to subsidize the poor [in order] to avoid revolution and to exempt the wealthy” from adverse outcomes of government policy.  The wealthy then “reciprocate by enriching and empowering the governing classes.”

On his pages 40-42, Hanson points out that the contemporary U.S. middle class foresees very limited possibilities for long-term employment and family formation; and a much greater likelihood of becoming peasants resembling their rural predecessors in having few options.  However, some problematic options do exist: Hanson writes of two recent, government-sponsored advertisements for ameliorating individual helplessness via public largess.  First, the Pajama Boy (2010), an Obamacare supporter, portrays a young man who appears self-assured and at ease while pitching Obamacare despite wearing a child’s red-plaid pajamas.  This advertisement, Hanson finds, is an inadvertent confirmation of de Tocqueville’s warning about the connection between government subsidies and eternal childishness.  Second, the Life of Julia (2012) is the story of a woman reflecting back on her satisfying lifetime of harvesting public payments and accommodations, all the while oblivious to the looming financial problems of the Social Security system.  Neither the Pajama Boy nor Julia offer a real solution to the contemporary violation of Kant’s third criterion for citizenship.

In sharp distinction to Julia’s lifetime reflections on her dependency, Hanson (on his page 60) can reflect back on his “free-range” childhood in Fresno County, California, and see something completely different: He and his siblings could wander unsupervised over miles of rural countryside as the children of free citizens in a stable Republic.  By today, however, that Republic - - a least in its previous incarnation - - has already fallen; because its citizens, having run afoul of Kant’s third criterion for citizenship, have for the most part gone bankrupt, moved away, and are dying out.  Indeed, allowing children so to roam the countryside today would be considered as a form of child abuse because of ubiquitous gangs, untethered fighting dogs, and illegal, toxic trash dumps.  The Republic that we see today does indeed seem largely to have achieved the bimodal distribution of peasants and masters that Hanson has described.