Externalization (3): Philosophy of Religion

In a scene set in the London of the early 1920’s, the Academy Award winning 1981 film, Chariots of Fire, portrays a prominent, young, female opera singer going to a restaurant with a prominent, young, male Olympic-athlete-in-training.  At one point during dinner conversation she languidly, yet forcefully, expresses the spirit of their age toward religious differences: “People don’t care!”  This response would also seem to encapsulate a common Western attitude toward religious differences in the 2020’s: All legitimate religions are said to be aiming not only at the same truth but also at a therapeutic Zeitgeist (spirit of the age).  One thinks of Philip Rieff’s 1966 book, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud, in which the psychological person is said to have replaced the religious person.  Rieff maintained that - - in the perceived race to provide consolation - - therapy and techniques of self-realization would rapidly replace religion.  More recently, the ascendency of the psychological person has also been seen in the Oprah television phenomenon.

      Among some Western opinion leaders of the 2020’s, nothing could be less therapeutic than Hegel’s fairly opaque writing on religion and Zeitgeist dating back to the 1820’s and even earlier; but yet his views on developing natural consciousness, Reason, Nature, Spirit, Religion, and Absolute Idea continue to find intellectual resonance.  The Absolute Idea is self-determining Reason externalizing itself as Nature and Spirit in order to entertain movements of thought (theses, antitheses, and syntheses) leading to enhanced knowledge.  Externalization amounts to “losing track of one’s self-consciousness while thinking about a topic.”  Spirit (both individual spirits and societal Zeitgeister) returns to the Absolute Idea with each synthesized increment of knowledge, consistent with the final cause of Absolute Knowing.  In Hegel’s terminology, “entäuβern” means “to externalize, renounce, relinquish, divest, dispose, or part with.”  Externalization (Entäuβerung) into Nature and Spirit is also called bifurcation (Entzweiung) or unfolding (Entfaltung).  [An introduction to Hegel has been given in the last two months’ blog posts, as well as in the Hegel chapter in my book, An Initial View of Final Causes.]

      Synthesis preserves whatever elements of truth are originally present in thesis and antithesis, even as apparent contradictions between them are cancelled (aufgehoben).  Hegel’s Axiom, “Thought is Being,” implies that Thought reaching higher levels of knowledge is the same as Being perfecting its essence and becoming self-aware.  Over time, Thought and Being each become more of what they truly are.  This spontaneous development of natural consciousness is the Absolute (virtually the same as the Absolute Idea).  The Absolute is not a freestanding power that thwarts the will of individuals and societies; it is the expression of the efforts of individuals and societies; and it does not exclude unintentional effects.

      The development of natural consciousness leads to Religion, or self-aware Absolute Being. The present writer reads Hegel as follows: Religion, immanent in a matrix of particular religions existing at any one time, has evolved from natural to aesthetic to revealed.  Over time, any particular religion has the possibility of asymptotically approaching the status of revealed, true Religion, in which Spirit knows itself as Spirit.  Which particular religion, if any, in today’s matrix has the best chance of asymptotically leading to true Religion is an enigma.  Until the end of time, Spirit is always evolving and updating the matrix of particular religions.  This evolution does not exclude unintended consequences and surprising discontinuities on its route towards unshakeable orthodoxy.  Thus, any current particular religion could turn out to be a dead end, superseded by the development of some other particular religion.  Hegel’s successors could not agree whether the final orthodoxy would be left-Hegelian (proto-Marxist) or right-Hegelian (orthodox Christian).  The present writer concludes that Hegelian theory presents the development of natural consciousness as the key to understanding the process of philosophy and theology, but does not guarantee the ultimate content of Religion.

      God, the ultimate condition for the possibility of religious experience, remains only an abstraction until the Absolute Idea externalizes itself as Nature and Spirit in pursuit of Absolute Knowing.  Hegel maintained that natural consciousness recognizes an immediate presence of God and does not rely on introspection of its thoughts in order to infer the existence of God as an external entity (¶ 758 in Phenomenology of Spirit).  Speculative knowledge (das spekulative Wissen) regards God as pure Thought, Essence, Being, Existence, and Self (¶ 761). Existing independently of any finite being, God is Being itself, i.e., Absolute Being or the highest degree of reality.  Finite beings are more or less real in proportion as they are more or less self-determining, which is to say, more or less rational.  Thus, one arrives at the familiar Hegelian principle, “the real is the rational, and the rational is the real.”  In view of Hegel’s Axiom, God is also Thought itself, possessed of Absolute Knowing, devoted to the recollection of its lived experiences, and “sunk in the night of self-consciousness” (¶ 808).  

      In the Introduction to his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel observes that “one could easily arrive at the view that a widespread, nearly universal indifference toward the doctrine of the faith formerly regarded as essential has entered into … public [consciousness, and] … the work of salvation has taken on a significance so strongly psychological … that only the semblance of the ancient doctrine of the church remains.”  Thus, even in the 1820’s Hegel was battling against the indifferentism expressed on the 1920’s film vignette previously cited.  The task of the philosophy of religion is, in Hegel’s view, to show that God can be known cognitively.  Hegel proposed a four-fold theory of religious knowledge: Faith, or immediate knowledge, is the certainty that God exists, albeit without insight into the necessity of that existence.  Feeling, or the subjective aspect of immediate knowledge, has the critical shortcoming that it cannot make judgments of true or false, or of good or evil, until it has been fortified by thought.  Representation (Vorstellung) is the content of faith in pre-rational form, as in Biblical stories that bear allegorical, metaphorical, or mystical senses.  Finally, thought is the content of faith in rational form, which provides context, relationships between ideas, and universality.  In a memorable passage, Hegel emphasizes the preeminence of thought in religious knowledge: “Animals have feelings, but only feelings.  Human beings think, and they alone have religion. 

      For Hegel, Christianity was, generally speaking and from all indications, the fullest expression of revealed, true Religion available in his time.  There were parallels between orthodox Christianity and his dialectical philosophy.  For example, in the Biblical text, Philippians 2:7-8, divine consciousness appears as Christ, who “emptied himself … obedient to the point of death …” (English Standard Version) or “entäuβerte sich selbst … gehorsam bis zum Tod …” (Schlachter 2000).  This emptying was an essential part of the process of God reconciling the world to himself in Christ (Second Corinthians 5:19).  This divine emptying and reconciling is an analog of self-consciousness externalizing itself while resolving contradictions in its understanding of the world and, thus reconciled, returning to itself. 

      In summary, and in the opinion of the present writer, the Hegelian dialectic proposes to specify the process by which on-going philosophical and theological developments occur and to facilitate an understanding of the religious past and present.  In Hegel’s philosophy of religion, God can be known cognitively via faith, feeling, representation, and thought, thereby increasing the chances of successfully “walking by faith and not by sight” (Second Corinthians 5:7).  The Hegelian dialectic does not, however, predict the relative future success of any particular religion (including the many branches of Christianity), because unintended consequences of rational actions jeopardize the future development of any particular religion: A promising and orthodox particular religion today may become a desiccated husk tomorrow. 

      (Unless the author is swept away by the rapidly evolving coronavirus pandemic, the next posting date for this blog will be July 1, 2020.)

Externalization (2): Phenomenology

Last month we investigated the philosophical terms alienation and externalization.  For Sartre, subject and object (or self and world) arise in tandem during an externalization of pre-reflexive consciousness.  For Hegel, self-development occurs by experiencing the world objectively during externalization (Entäuβerung) or self-alienation (similar to losing oneself in one’s object of inquiry), followed by a return to self.  The verb entäuβernmeans “to reverse a state of inwardness,” i.e., to externalize; intensifies the verb äuβern (to say, utter, express, or externalize); and also bears the sense “to renounce, relinquish, divest, dispose, or part with.”  Phenomenology is Hegel’s way of thinking about consciousness itself, consistent with his view that Thought is Being.

      The translator, A. V. Miller, numbered all 808 paragraphs in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes).  In one computer-based search of the German text for the sub-string “entäuβer”, 44 instances were found.  The first instance, in Miller’s ¶ 229, occurs in a section on the freedom of the self-consciousness to surrender marks of individuality.  Through these “moments of surrender,” consciousness itself is said to obtain the certainty, “to have divested itself of its ‘I’” (“seines ‘Ich’ sich entäuβert zu haben”).  In so doing, consciousness turns its immediate self-consciousness into a thing or objective existence.

      Central to the thought of Hegel was the idea that movements of thought occur in consciousness, be that the consciousness of individuals or the collective, cumulative consciousness of all rational beings.  Within consciousness, dialectical thought-pairs occur as thesis and antithesis (e.g., Being and Nothing) and are resolved on a higher plane of insight (or truth or knowledge) as synthesis (e.g., Becoming).  “Thought-pairs occurring” is the same as “consciousness externalizing itself as thesis and antithesis.”

      Synthesis preserves whatever elements of truth are originally present in thesis and antithesis.  Apparent contradictions between thesis and antithesis are cancelled (aufgehoben).  But it is axiomatic for Hegel that Thought is Being, because the burden of proof that they are different has never been met.  Therefore, the spontaneous process of Thought reaching higher levels of knowledge is the same as Being perfecting its essence and becoming aware of itself.  This spontaneous process of consciousness, Thought or Being becoming itself, is the Absolute.  Hegel sometimes speaks of the Absolute as rationality in Being and of the Absolute Idea as self-determining Reason.

      The Absolute Idea externalizes itself into Nature and Spirit in order to fulfill the self-development (self-unfolding) of consciousness.  In other words, Spirit, acting through its individual spirits, investigates Nature and returns to the Absolute Idea with increased knowledge.  Spirit, acting through its succession of Zeitgeister, investigates politics, history, art, religion, etc. and likewise returns to the Absolute Idea with increased knowledge.  This “returning” is actively experienced: As Hegel remarks in ¶ 802, everything that we know must come before us as lived experience.

      The pinnacle of Hegelian philosophy, Absolute Knowing, is the final cause of the development of consciousness.  Developmental levels include the sense-certainty of external things; the perception of the external world; the understanding of things and forces indicative of a supersensible realm; self-consciousness leading to inter-subjective alienation; Reason, which is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality; Spirit, which is Reason that is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the word as itself; Religion, which is Spirit aware of itself as Spirit and conscious of self-aware Absolute Being; and Absolute Knowing, which is the grasping of all truth in philosophical form. 

      Hegel notes in ¶ 808 that History is a conscious process of Spirit externalized or emptied out into Time (an die Zeit entäuβert), creating a languid succession of Zeitgeister bearing knowledge and returning to self-consciousness (the Self).  This succession is time-consuming, because the self has to penetrate and to digest the mass of knowledge so returned (“weil das Selbst diesen ganzen Reichtum seiner Substanz zu durchdringen und zu verdauen hat”).  Ultimately, the Self knows what it is; withdraws within itself; and devotes itself to the recollection of its lived experiences, “sunk in the night of self-consciousness.”  In other words, “the goal, Absolute Knowledge, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, has for its path the recollection of Zeitgeister as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their realm.”

Externalization (1): Linguistics

In Franz Kafka’s novella, The Metamorphosis (Die Verwandlung), Gregor Samsa experiences himself one morning as a “monstrous vermin, bug, or insect” (einem ungeheuren Ungeziefer), enduring isolation, alienation (Entfremdung), and dehumanization.  An Entfremdungseffekt [based on the root word, fremd (strange or alien)] is the creation of perceived estrangement or alienation via the presentation of a person or object without normal context.  Such a presentation (de-familiarization or de-naturalization) may serve as the first step in an attempt to see something anew.  While analyzing the Entfremdungseffekt in theatrical works, Berthold Brecht coined the synonym, Verfremdungseffekt, to indicate an attempt to increase understanding by breaking down the wall between the audience and the actors.  [The prefix ver- typically connotes a transgression of boundaries, as in the example of verlängern (to prolong or exceed a length-boundary).]  An example of the “V-effekt” would be an actor temporarily departing from his script during a play in order to lecture the audience directly.

      Alienation is related to externalization.  For Sartre, subject and object (or self and world) arise in tandem during an externalization of pre-reflexive consciousness: Assuming a primordial, stable self leads only to “bad-faith,” renunciation of freedom, and alienation.  For Hegel, self-development (development of the natural consciousness) occurs in stages: One treats oneself as an objective thing in a process of externalization (Entäuβerung), which is also known as self-alienation (Sich-Entfremdung).  One then proceeds to experience the world objectively, formulate various theses and antitheses, resolve contradictions, synthesize higher levels of insight, and “return to oneself” more fully aware of Truth and Being.  The “return to self” is Hegel’s Zu-Sich-Zurückkehrung.  Externalization is an intellectual process for Hegel, related to losing oneself in one’s object of inquiry and returning to self-consciousness with additional insights; whereas Marx “stood Hegel on his head” by emphasizing economic production as that which may be alienated from an individual.

      Regrettably, the native speaker of English can be led astray by the term Entäuβerung because of the following train of thought: The German verb prefix ent- is sometimes used for the English equivalent of un-, dis-, or de-.  For example, entfesseln means to unchain; entdecken means to discover; and entblättern means to defoliate.  Applying this logic to the verb äuβern (to say, utter, express, or externalize thought in some manner), one might infer that ent + äuβern = un + to externalize = to internalize.  Such an inference would be wrong and would “stand Hegel on his head” in yet another manner!  How might we put this train of thought back on its tracks?

      A more comprehensive review of the German verb prefix ent- reveals that three general areas of meaning exist, pertaining to: (1) the beginning of an activity, (2) the separation or removal of something, and (3) the reversal of a state or process.

      (1) Examples of beginning: The verb entstehen can be thought of as “to begin to stand,” i.e., “to originate or come into existence.”  The verb entbrennen can be construed as “to begin to burn,” or “to flare up.”  An implicit sense of “to begin” also occurs in the meaning of entsprieβen, “(to begin) to sprout from”; of entspringen, “(to begin) to arise or issue from”; and of entleeren, “(to begin) to make empty,” or more simply, “to empty.” 

      (2) Examples of removing: The verbs entfesseln, entehren, entarten, entblättern, and entgiften refer to removing chains, honor, form, leaves, and poison, respectively; are rendered in English by verbs containing the prefix un-, dis-, or de- (unchain, dishonor, deform, defoliate, and detoxify); and do not mean beginning to have chains, honor, form, leaves, or poison.  As another example, compare the verb entrücken (to remove from) to the verb rücken (to move, march, or approach): “die Musik hat sie der Gegenwart entrückt” means “the music removed her from the here and now,” not “the music began to move her in the here and now.”  Finally, the verb entfalten refers to removing folds and is translated as “to unfold” or “to develop”; it does not mean “to begin to fold.”

      (3) Examples of reversing:  The verbs enteilen, entfernen, entfliehen, and entkräften refer to reversing states of unhurriedness, proximity, residence, and strength, respectively; and are rendered in English by the expressions “to hurry away,” “to move far away,” “to flee,” and “to weaken.”  The prefix un-, dis-, or de- may also be used in this case: The verb entdecken, referring to a reversal of a state of ignorance, is translated as “to discover”; while the verb entfremden, referring to a reversal of a state of familiarity, is interpreted as “to de-familiarize” or “to alienate.”  The essential point is not whether the prefix un-, dis-, or de- is used, but whether there is an implicit understanding of reversal.  Hence, we can at last resolve the conundrum from which this investigation began: The verb entäuβern means to reverse a state of inwardness, i.e., to externalize; merely intensifies the verb äuβern (to say, utter, express, or externalize); and can also be rendered as “to renounce, relinquish, divest, dispose, or part with.

      The translator, A. V. Miller, numbered all 808 paragraphs in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford University Press, 1977).  In one computer-based search of the corresponding German text for the sub-string “entäuβer” (which should find the strings Entäuβerung, entäuβern, and entäuβert), 44 instances were found.  The very first instance occurs in a section on the freedom of the self-consciousness, in Miller’s paragraph 229, where “moments of surrender” enable the consciousness to obtain “the certainty of having truly divested itself of its ‘I’ and of having turned its immediate self-consciousness into a thing, into an objective existence” (“die Gewiβheit, in Wahrheit seines ‘Ich’ sich entäuβert [zu haben], und sein unmittelbares Selbstbewuβtsein zu einem Dinge, zu einem gegenständlichen Sein gemacht zu haben”).

      Thus did an intellectual industry dedicated to the analysis of externalization and alienation come into being!  In next month’s blog post we will consider in more detail the role of externalization in Hegel’s Phenomenology.

Philosophy on the 86th Floor

     Decades ago, someone jumped from the observation deck on the 86th floor of the Empire State Building, only to be blown by a gust of wind to a lower ledge from which she was saved.  Glowing endorsements of the philosophy of existentialism and authenticity bring to mind that vertiginous observation deck: Surely, if existentialism entails radical human freedom, construed as the power to make a choice, any choice; then how could any truly authentic existentialist repeatedly visit that deck and yet never decide to jump from it?  One is left to speculate whether any existentialists have ever visited that deck, and if so, whether favorable winds have saved some of them from true authenticity. 

     The present writer thought again of that 86th floor while reading a favorable account of existentialism in the book review “Choose Your Own Adventure” by Professor John Kaag in the May 11, 2018 Wall Street Journal.  The reviewed book is entitled “The Existentialist’s Survival Guide,” by Professor Gordon Marino, who “has produced an honest and moving book of self-help for readers generally disposed to loathe the genre.”  Marino paraphrases Camus in writing that many people “have committed intellectual hari-kari … [in part by] mentally constructing an apparatus like faith in God” to order their lives.  Kaag writes that “it’s not that Mr. Marino disparages faith … [but] contends that faith never gives the certainty many religious seekers crave.”  However, if the charge of “intellectual hari-kari” does not count as a disparagement of faith, then it is hard to see what would so count.  Moreover, great numbers of Christians understand faith as the assurance of things hoped for and not as an expression of post-Cartesian certainty.  One might wish to consider alternatives to existentialism.

     Such an alternative is found in essentialism, whose paradigm, Platonic philosophy, considers that Ideas are essences and that essence is ontologically prior to existence.  Plato’s Demiurge looks to Ideas when setting about to fashion pieces of creation, thereby adding to the stock of existent things.  To the extent that Western philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, essentialism has been the long-term winner in the debate with existentialism, which holds the opposing view that existence is prior to essence.  How can one explain the post World War II fascination with the priority of existence?

     One might view existentialism as arising from an objectionable definition of human freedom as the power to make a choice, any choice.  It would seem that this freedom is more reasonably construed as the power to do what one ought, leaving open the question of what theoretical apparatus best controls the discussion of what one ought to do.  The impression arises that, to the extent that an existentialist cannot find a moral theory affording desired results, he or she finds it expedient to excise the moral theory intervening between freedom and action and to adopt the definition of freedom based on “choice, any choice.”

     Is there a theoretical preference for the priority of essence or existence?  For Hegel, natural consciousness contains movements of thought that proceed by (what others termed) “thesis-antithesis-synthesis,” which is a teleological process whose final cause is the ultimate, or essential, state of Absolute Knowing.  In the Aristotelian tradition, a final cause is first in specification (essence) and last in generation (existence). Thus, Hegel’s system is essentialist and, eo ipso, objectionable to the existentialist, Sartre. 

     For Sartre, being in itself (massive, mysterious, and lacking freedom) undergoes a type of ontological fission, or “self-splitting,” from which arise the existence of consciousness and a world of finite beings. Human freedom lies in the structure of human consciousness and is not a property of any human essence, which must be constructed piecemeal from human actions.  But on Sartre’s theory, what is the first existent thing?  It would seem to be a reality capable of creating its own essence.  But this reality might be supposed to have other characteristics as well and to constitute the human essence, in which case existence and essence would be co-primeval.  Moreover, as an empirical matter, human freedom seems to be limited by sociological, psychological, and moral factors; hence, “what a person becomes” is likewise limited.  On balance, the present writer finds that essentialism is more compelling than existentialism.

     One concludes from these considerations that erstwhile existentialists may be permitted to take the elevator down from the 86th floor.

Specters Old and New

     In a news item from May 5, 2018 it is reported that the Chinese government has given Karl Marx’ hometown (Trier, Germany) an 18-foot tall statue of Karl Marx to commemorate his 200th birthday anniversary.  While former anti-communists such as Vaclav Klaus believe that the statue makes a mockery of history, mere history cannot compete with economics: The city of Trier has been benefitting from Chinese tourism, and its mayor says that “it’s the right time to deal with Marx in this form.” 

     Judging from the tepid public reaction to the new statue of Marx in Trier, the historical memory of Marx, Engels, and the Communist Manifesto seems to be fading.  Hence, we will mention that the relatively youthful Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels collaborated on writing the Manifesto during the winter of 1847 to 1848, publishing it in London in February 1848 as a 23-page brochure.  At the time, governments across Europe were already tottering for various reasons, and the communists needed an official creed in order to unify their approach to the ongoing crises.  

     The Manifesto introduces the specter of communism as haunting (going around in) Europe: All the powers of old Europe [Pope, Tsar, Metternich (Austrian chancellor), and Guizot (French premier), among others], although failing to define the precise nature of this specter, have created fairy tales (Märchen) about it and have allied themselves in a kind of wild-animal chase (Hetzjagd) after it.  (One thinks of hounds in a fury of bloodlust hunting a fox.)  It is in opposition to these fairy tales and on behalf of the newly formed Communist League that Marx and Engels wrote the Manifesto, including several sections on the proletariat, the bourgeoisie, and the communist version of world history.  The visible ill effects of communism awaited the Russian Revolution, and it took longer still for critics such as Boris Pasternak (Dr. Zhivago) and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (The Gulag Archipelago) to document those ill effects.

     Having died seventeen years before the Manifesto, Hegel cannot fairly be blamed for its excesses.  Indeed, he had shown the good sense to say that, even if world history is the self-unfolding of Spirit, we cannot predict the details of history.  Post-Hegelian radicals, however, had to make such predictions in order to attract attention.  Some Marxist predictions presupposed that “all social facts can be reduced to economics,” a view that became known as “economism.” 

     Although today’s specter of obsequious statuary is less ominous than 1848’s specter of communism, the contemporary specter of economism could become quite serious.  In the April 2018 edition of First Things, Richard H. Spady focuses on the gradual transformation of what had been convenient and contingent assumptions in economic models into normative goals for social planners.  For example, some economic models assume that trade expansion, mobility of labor and capital, and technological change are always good.  Spady finds that there is countervailing evidence that these economic factors also bring some negative consequences: Recent economic change has brought “widespread despair, resentment, and dysfunction among the lower two-thirds of American society,” consistent with Case and Deaton’s data on “dramatic decreases in life expectancy among white, high-school-educated Americans.”  Spady believes that this new specter of economism, if not explicitly dealt with, will lead to an era of increased societal conflict.

     Concurring with the spirit of Spady’s analysis, albeit without recourse to the terminology of “economism,” the dean of the Columbia Business School recently commented on the problematic nature of trade and immigration: He described a recent field trip that he took with 20 M.B.A. students - - not to the usual, globally-elite destinations such as Hong Kong, London, or Delhi - - but to Youngstown, Ohio in order to observe the specter of real industrial decline.  “Whether it’s Brexit in the U.K. or the debate over trade and immigration in the U.S.,  … [people ask] ‘Why am I supporting something that benefits on average, when this just means [that] Columbia M.B.A.s get it all?’ ”