Externalization (1): Linguistics

In Franz Kafka’s novella, The Metamorphosis (Die Verwandlung), Gregor Samsa experiences himself one morning as a “monstrous vermin, bug, or insect” (einem ungeheuren Ungeziefer), enduring isolation, alienation (Entfremdung), and dehumanization.  An Entfremdungseffekt [based on the root word, fremd (strange or alien)] is the creation of perceived estrangement or alienation via the presentation of a person or object without normal context.  Such a presentation (de-familiarization or de-naturalization) may serve as the first step in an attempt to see something anew.  While analyzing the Entfremdungseffekt in theatrical works, Berthold Brecht coined the synonym, Verfremdungseffekt, to indicate an attempt to increase understanding by breaking down the wall between the audience and the actors.  [The prefix ver- typically connotes a transgression of boundaries, as in the example of verlängern (to prolong or exceed a length-boundary).]  An example of the “V-effekt” would be an actor temporarily departing from his script during a play in order to lecture the audience directly.

      Alienation is related to externalization.  For Sartre, subject and object (or self and world) arise in tandem during an externalization of pre-reflexive consciousness: Assuming a primordial, stable self leads only to “bad-faith,” renunciation of freedom, and alienation.  For Hegel, self-development (development of the natural consciousness) occurs in stages: One treats oneself as an objective thing in a process of externalization (Entäuβerung), which is also known as self-alienation (Sich-Entfremdung).  One then proceeds to experience the world objectively, formulate various theses and antitheses, resolve contradictions, synthesize higher levels of insight, and “return to oneself” more fully aware of Truth and Being.  The “return to self” is Hegel’s Zu-Sich-Zurückkehrung.  Externalization is an intellectual process for Hegel, related to losing oneself in one’s object of inquiry and returning to self-consciousness with additional insights; whereas Marx “stood Hegel on his head” by emphasizing economic production as that which may be alienated from an individual.

      Regrettably, the native speaker of English can be led astray by the term Entäuβerung because of the following train of thought: The German verb prefix ent- is sometimes used for the English equivalent of un-, dis-, or de-.  For example, entfesseln means to unchain; entdecken means to discover; and entblättern means to defoliate.  Applying this logic to the verb äuβern (to say, utter, express, or externalize thought in some manner), one might infer that ent + äuβern = un + to externalize = to internalize.  Such an inference would be wrong and would “stand Hegel on his head” in yet another manner!  How might we put this train of thought back on its tracks?

      A more comprehensive review of the German verb prefix ent- reveals that three general areas of meaning exist, pertaining to: (1) the beginning of an activity, (2) the separation or removal of something, and (3) the reversal of a state or process.

      (1) Examples of beginning: The verb entstehen can be thought of as “to begin to stand,” i.e., “to originate or come into existence.”  The verb entbrennen can be construed as “to begin to burn,” or “to flare up.”  An implicit sense of “to begin” also occurs in the meaning of entsprieβen, “(to begin) to sprout from”; of entspringen, “(to begin) to arise or issue from”; and of entleeren, “(to begin) to make empty,” or more simply, “to empty.” 

      (2) Examples of removing: The verbs entfesseln, entehren, entarten, entblättern, and entgiften refer to removing chains, honor, form, leaves, and poison, respectively; are rendered in English by verbs containing the prefix un-, dis-, or de- (unchain, dishonor, deform, defoliate, and detoxify); and do not mean beginning to have chains, honor, form, leaves, or poison.  As another example, compare the verb entrücken (to remove from) to the verb rücken (to move, march, or approach): “die Musik hat sie der Gegenwart entrückt” means “the music removed her from the here and now,” not “the music began to move her in the here and now.”  Finally, the verb entfalten refers to removing folds and is translated as “to unfold” or “to develop”; it does not mean “to begin to fold.”

      (3) Examples of reversing:  The verbs enteilen, entfernen, entfliehen, and entkräften refer to reversing states of unhurriedness, proximity, residence, and strength, respectively; and are rendered in English by the expressions “to hurry away,” “to move far away,” “to flee,” and “to weaken.”  The prefix un-, dis-, or de- may also be used in this case: The verb entdecken, referring to a reversal of a state of ignorance, is translated as “to discover”; while the verb entfremden, referring to a reversal of a state of familiarity, is interpreted as “to de-familiarize” or “to alienate.”  The essential point is not whether the prefix un-, dis-, or de- is used, but whether there is an implicit understanding of reversal.  Hence, we can at last resolve the conundrum from which this investigation began: The verb entäuβern means to reverse a state of inwardness, i.e., to externalize; merely intensifies the verb äuβern (to say, utter, express, or externalize); and can also be rendered as “to renounce, relinquish, divest, dispose, or part with.

      The translator, A. V. Miller, numbered all 808 paragraphs in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford University Press, 1977).  In one computer-based search of the corresponding German text for the sub-string “entäuβer” (which should find the strings Entäuβerung, entäuβern, and entäuβert), 44 instances were found.  The very first instance occurs in a section on the freedom of the self-consciousness, in Miller’s paragraph 229, where “moments of surrender” enable the consciousness to obtain “the certainty of having truly divested itself of its ‘I’ and of having turned its immediate self-consciousness into a thing, into an objective existence” (“die Gewiβheit, in Wahrheit seines ‘Ich’ sich entäuβert [zu haben], und sein unmittelbares Selbstbewuβtsein zu einem Dinge, zu einem gegenständlichen Sein gemacht zu haben”).

      Thus did an intellectual industry dedicated to the analysis of externalization and alienation come into being!  In next month’s blog post we will consider in more detail the role of externalization in Hegel’s Phenomenology.

Philosophy on the 86th Floor

     Decades ago, someone jumped from the observation deck on the 86th floor of the Empire State Building, only to be blown by a gust of wind to a lower ledge from which she was saved.  Glowing endorsements of the philosophy of existentialism and authenticity bring to mind that vertiginous observation deck: Surely, if existentialism entails radical human freedom, construed as the power to make a choice, any choice; then how could any truly authentic existentialist repeatedly visit that deck and yet never decide to jump from it?  One is left to speculate whether any existentialists have ever visited that deck, and if so, whether favorable winds have saved some of them from true authenticity. 

     The present writer thought again of that 86th floor while reading a favorable account of existentialism in the book review “Choose Your Own Adventure” by Professor John Kaag in the May 11, 2018 Wall Street Journal.  The reviewed book is entitled “The Existentialist’s Survival Guide,” by Professor Gordon Marino, who “has produced an honest and moving book of self-help for readers generally disposed to loathe the genre.”  Marino paraphrases Camus in writing that many people “have committed intellectual hari-kari … [in part by] mentally constructing an apparatus like faith in God” to order their lives.  Kaag writes that “it’s not that Mr. Marino disparages faith … [but] contends that faith never gives the certainty many religious seekers crave.”  However, if the charge of “intellectual hari-kari” does not count as a disparagement of faith, then it is hard to see what would so count.  Moreover, great numbers of Christians understand faith as the assurance of things hoped for and not as an expression of post-Cartesian certainty.  One might wish to consider alternatives to existentialism.

     Such an alternative is found in essentialism, whose paradigm, Platonic philosophy, considers that Ideas are essences and that essence is ontologically prior to existence.  Plato’s Demiurge looks to Ideas when setting about to fashion pieces of creation, thereby adding to the stock of existent things.  To the extent that Western philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, essentialism has been the long-term winner in the debate with existentialism, which holds the opposing view that existence is prior to essence.  How can one explain the post World War II fascination with the priority of existence?

     One might view existentialism as arising from an objectionable definition of human freedom as the power to make a choice, any choice.  It would seem that this freedom is more reasonably construed as the power to do what one ought, leaving open the question of what theoretical apparatus best controls the discussion of what one ought to do.  The impression arises that, to the extent that an existentialist cannot find a moral theory affording desired results, he or she finds it expedient to excise the moral theory intervening between freedom and action and to adopt the definition of freedom based on “choice, any choice.”

     Is there a theoretical preference for the priority of essence or existence?  For Hegel, natural consciousness contains movements of thought that proceed by (what others termed) “thesis-antithesis-synthesis,” which is a teleological process whose final cause is the ultimate, or essential, state of Absolute Knowing.  In the Aristotelian tradition, a final cause is first in specification (essence) and last in generation (existence). Thus, Hegel’s system is essentialist and, eo ipso, objectionable to the existentialist, Sartre. 

     For Sartre, being in itself (massive, mysterious, and lacking freedom) undergoes a type of ontological fission, or “self-splitting,” from which arise the existence of consciousness and a world of finite beings. Human freedom lies in the structure of human consciousness and is not a property of any human essence, which must be constructed piecemeal from human actions.  But on Sartre’s theory, what is the first existent thing?  It would seem to be a reality capable of creating its own essence.  But this reality might be supposed to have other characteristics as well and to constitute the human essence, in which case existence and essence would be co-primeval.  Moreover, as an empirical matter, human freedom seems to be limited by sociological, psychological, and moral factors; hence, “what a person becomes” is likewise limited.  On balance, the present writer finds that essentialism is more compelling than existentialism.

     One concludes from these considerations that erstwhile existentialists may be permitted to take the elevator down from the 86th floor.