Externalization (2): Phenomenology

Last month we investigated the philosophical terms alienation and externalization.  For Sartre, subject and object (or self and world) arise in tandem during an externalization of pre-reflexive consciousness.  For Hegel, self-development occurs by experiencing the world objectively during externalization (Entäuβerung) or self-alienation (similar to losing oneself in one’s object of inquiry), followed by a return to self.  The verb entäuβernmeans “to reverse a state of inwardness,” i.e., to externalize; intensifies the verb äuβern (to say, utter, express, or externalize); and also bears the sense “to renounce, relinquish, divest, dispose, or part with.”  Phenomenology is Hegel’s way of thinking about consciousness itself, consistent with his view that Thought is Being.

      The translator, A. V. Miller, numbered all 808 paragraphs in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes).  In one computer-based search of the German text for the sub-string “entäuβer”, 44 instances were found.  The first instance, in Miller’s ¶ 229, occurs in a section on the freedom of the self-consciousness to surrender marks of individuality.  Through these “moments of surrender,” consciousness itself is said to obtain the certainty, “to have divested itself of its ‘I’” (“seines ‘Ich’ sich entäuβert zu haben”).  In so doing, consciousness turns its immediate self-consciousness into a thing or objective existence.

      Central to the thought of Hegel was the idea that movements of thought occur in consciousness, be that the consciousness of individuals or the collective, cumulative consciousness of all rational beings.  Within consciousness, dialectical thought-pairs occur as thesis and antithesis (e.g., Being and Nothing) and are resolved on a higher plane of insight (or truth or knowledge) as synthesis (e.g., Becoming).  “Thought-pairs occurring” is the same as “consciousness externalizing itself as thesis and antithesis.”

      Synthesis preserves whatever elements of truth are originally present in thesis and antithesis.  Apparent contradictions between thesis and antithesis are cancelled (aufgehoben).  But it is axiomatic for Hegel that Thought is Being, because the burden of proof that they are different has never been met.  Therefore, the spontaneous process of Thought reaching higher levels of knowledge is the same as Being perfecting its essence and becoming aware of itself.  This spontaneous process of consciousness, Thought or Being becoming itself, is the Absolute.  Hegel sometimes speaks of the Absolute as rationality in Being and of the Absolute Idea as self-determining Reason.

      The Absolute Idea externalizes itself into Nature and Spirit in order to fulfill the self-development (self-unfolding) of consciousness.  In other words, Spirit, acting through its individual spirits, investigates Nature and returns to the Absolute Idea with increased knowledge.  Spirit, acting through its succession of Zeitgeister, investigates politics, history, art, religion, etc. and likewise returns to the Absolute Idea with increased knowledge.  This “returning” is actively experienced: As Hegel remarks in ¶ 802, everything that we know must come before us as lived experience.

      The pinnacle of Hegelian philosophy, Absolute Knowing, is the final cause of the development of consciousness.  Developmental levels include the sense-certainty of external things; the perception of the external world; the understanding of things and forces indicative of a supersensible realm; self-consciousness leading to inter-subjective alienation; Reason, which is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality; Spirit, which is Reason that is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the word as itself; Religion, which is Spirit aware of itself as Spirit and conscious of self-aware Absolute Being; and Absolute Knowing, which is the grasping of all truth in philosophical form. 

      Hegel notes in ¶ 808 that History is a conscious process of Spirit externalized or emptied out into Time (an die Zeit entäuβert), creating a languid succession of Zeitgeister bearing knowledge and returning to self-consciousness (the Self).  This succession is time-consuming, because the self has to penetrate and to digest the mass of knowledge so returned (“weil das Selbst diesen ganzen Reichtum seiner Substanz zu durchdringen und zu verdauen hat”).  Ultimately, the Self knows what it is; withdraws within itself; and devotes itself to the recollection of its lived experiences, “sunk in the night of self-consciousness.”  In other words, “the goal, Absolute Knowledge, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, has for its path the recollection of Zeitgeister as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their realm.”

Externalization (1): Linguistics

In Franz Kafka’s novella, The Metamorphosis (Die Verwandlung), Gregor Samsa experiences himself one morning as a “monstrous vermin, bug, or insect” (einem ungeheuren Ungeziefer), enduring isolation, alienation (Entfremdung), and dehumanization.  An Entfremdungseffekt [based on the root word, fremd (strange or alien)] is the creation of perceived estrangement or alienation via the presentation of a person or object without normal context.  Such a presentation (de-familiarization or de-naturalization) may serve as the first step in an attempt to see something anew.  While analyzing the Entfremdungseffekt in theatrical works, Berthold Brecht coined the synonym, Verfremdungseffekt, to indicate an attempt to increase understanding by breaking down the wall between the audience and the actors.  [The prefix ver- typically connotes a transgression of boundaries, as in the example of verlängern (to prolong or exceed a length-boundary).]  An example of the “V-effekt” would be an actor temporarily departing from his script during a play in order to lecture the audience directly.

      Alienation is related to externalization.  For Sartre, subject and object (or self and world) arise in tandem during an externalization of pre-reflexive consciousness: Assuming a primordial, stable self leads only to “bad-faith,” renunciation of freedom, and alienation.  For Hegel, self-development (development of the natural consciousness) occurs in stages: One treats oneself as an objective thing in a process of externalization (Entäuβerung), which is also known as self-alienation (Sich-Entfremdung).  One then proceeds to experience the world objectively, formulate various theses and antitheses, resolve contradictions, synthesize higher levels of insight, and “return to oneself” more fully aware of Truth and Being.  The “return to self” is Hegel’s Zu-Sich-Zurückkehrung.  Externalization is an intellectual process for Hegel, related to losing oneself in one’s object of inquiry and returning to self-consciousness with additional insights; whereas Marx “stood Hegel on his head” by emphasizing economic production as that which may be alienated from an individual.

      Regrettably, the native speaker of English can be led astray by the term Entäuβerung because of the following train of thought: The German verb prefix ent- is sometimes used for the English equivalent of un-, dis-, or de-.  For example, entfesseln means to unchain; entdecken means to discover; and entblättern means to defoliate.  Applying this logic to the verb äuβern (to say, utter, express, or externalize thought in some manner), one might infer that ent + äuβern = un + to externalize = to internalize.  Such an inference would be wrong and would “stand Hegel on his head” in yet another manner!  How might we put this train of thought back on its tracks?

      A more comprehensive review of the German verb prefix ent- reveals that three general areas of meaning exist, pertaining to: (1) the beginning of an activity, (2) the separation or removal of something, and (3) the reversal of a state or process.

      (1) Examples of beginning: The verb entstehen can be thought of as “to begin to stand,” i.e., “to originate or come into existence.”  The verb entbrennen can be construed as “to begin to burn,” or “to flare up.”  An implicit sense of “to begin” also occurs in the meaning of entsprieβen, “(to begin) to sprout from”; of entspringen, “(to begin) to arise or issue from”; and of entleeren, “(to begin) to make empty,” or more simply, “to empty.” 

      (2) Examples of removing: The verbs entfesseln, entehren, entarten, entblättern, and entgiften refer to removing chains, honor, form, leaves, and poison, respectively; are rendered in English by verbs containing the prefix un-, dis-, or de- (unchain, dishonor, deform, defoliate, and detoxify); and do not mean beginning to have chains, honor, form, leaves, or poison.  As another example, compare the verb entrücken (to remove from) to the verb rücken (to move, march, or approach): “die Musik hat sie der Gegenwart entrückt” means “the music removed her from the here and now,” not “the music began to move her in the here and now.”  Finally, the verb entfalten refers to removing folds and is translated as “to unfold” or “to develop”; it does not mean “to begin to fold.”

      (3) Examples of reversing:  The verbs enteilen, entfernen, entfliehen, and entkräften refer to reversing states of unhurriedness, proximity, residence, and strength, respectively; and are rendered in English by the expressions “to hurry away,” “to move far away,” “to flee,” and “to weaken.”  The prefix un-, dis-, or de- may also be used in this case: The verb entdecken, referring to a reversal of a state of ignorance, is translated as “to discover”; while the verb entfremden, referring to a reversal of a state of familiarity, is interpreted as “to de-familiarize” or “to alienate.”  The essential point is not whether the prefix un-, dis-, or de- is used, but whether there is an implicit understanding of reversal.  Hence, we can at last resolve the conundrum from which this investigation began: The verb entäuβern means to reverse a state of inwardness, i.e., to externalize; merely intensifies the verb äuβern (to say, utter, express, or externalize); and can also be rendered as “to renounce, relinquish, divest, dispose, or part with.

      The translator, A. V. Miller, numbered all 808 paragraphs in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford University Press, 1977).  In one computer-based search of the corresponding German text for the sub-string “entäuβer” (which should find the strings Entäuβerung, entäuβern, and entäuβert), 44 instances were found.  The very first instance occurs in a section on the freedom of the self-consciousness, in Miller’s paragraph 229, where “moments of surrender” enable the consciousness to obtain “the certainty of having truly divested itself of its ‘I’ and of having turned its immediate self-consciousness into a thing, into an objective existence” (“die Gewiβheit, in Wahrheit seines ‘Ich’ sich entäuβert [zu haben], und sein unmittelbares Selbstbewuβtsein zu einem Dinge, zu einem gegenständlichen Sein gemacht zu haben”).

      Thus did an intellectual industry dedicated to the analysis of externalization and alienation come into being!  In next month’s blog post we will consider in more detail the role of externalization in Hegel’s Phenomenology.

Timelessness, Natural Law, and Natural Religion

In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant notes that all rational knowledge (Vernunfterkenntnis) is either material (concerned with determinant objects, either of nature or of freedom) or formal (concerned with the form of understanding and reason themselves).  Philosophy, the study of all rational knowledge, is hence divided into physics (natural philosophy), ethics (moral philosophy), and logic, respectively.  All knowledge that lacks any empirical component is “pure,” or a priori.  Logic, being formal, is pure.  In contrast, physics and ethics have both empirical and non-empirical (metaphysical) components, giving rise to the metaphysics of nature and of morals, respectively.  

      In the Groundwork, Kant relegates the empirical part of ethics to practical anthropology, proposing instead to investigate the metaphysics of morals (Metaphysik der Sitten, sometimes abbreviated as Moral) in order to explain the absolute necessity carried by moral laws.  For example, “‘Thou shalt not lie,’ could not hold merely for mankind (Menschen), other rational beings (andere vernünftige Wesen) having no obligation to abide by it … the ground of obligation must be looked for … solely a priori in the concepts of pure reason.”  Practical rules in current worldly circumstances can never be absolute moral laws.  What is absolute is that one ought never to act except in such a way that he or she can also will that his or her subjective maxim becomes a universal law.

      A precept is a guiding principle or rule that is used to control, influence or regulate the conduct of an agent.  (In this discussion, “precept” is equivalent to “moral precept,” as opposed to some relatively minor point of etiquette or to some matter of belief or doctrine not necessarily tied to conduct.)  Those precepts, if any, having royal or divine origins are referred to as commandments, because of their authoritative source (variously described as worthy of respect, overpowering, or awe-inspiring): The commandment-giver is capable of meting out extremes of reward or punishment to agents following or violating the commandment.  Those precepts, if any, arising autonomously within each rational agent (due to rationality per se) Kant refers to as categorical imperatives, which are considered to be likewise worthy of respect (Achtung).  Of course, it is not clear that a rational agent, other than Kant himself, would reliably experience enough Achtung in order to avoid occasional backsliding.

      For Kant, moral precepts and rationality itself (the a priori concepts of pure reason and the categories of the understanding) are logically prior to empirical phenomena and, as such, are timeless and uncreated.  In contrast, the Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204 C.E.) maintained that moral precepts originate simultaneously with the creation of humankind.  On this view, moral precepts were created after “five days’ worth” of creation had already occurred; i.e., moral precepts are created in time, albeit it in undocumented (i.e., unrecorded or prehistoric) time.

      In the context of Maimonides’ theory, moral precepts are referred to as elements of natural law.  (See David Novak, “Does Natural Law Need Theology?” in First Things, November 2019.)  Subsequently to the inception of natural law, various human civilizations got around to writing down moral codes with varying degrees of success.  Regarding the motivation for individuals to adhere to moral precepts, Kant emphasizes respect (Achtung) for the timeless moral law and the autonomy of rational agents; whereas Maimonides emphasizes ingrained deference to (or fear of) a timeless, divine authority that also makes appearances in time.

      Recapitulating the natural-law theory, one might say that there is one creation event for the physical universe, including the time axis itself; followed by, in prehistoric time, the creation of humankind and the natural (moral) law itself; followed by, in historic time, the writing up of moral codes in various cultures.  In this theory, one must avoid equivocation on the term “creation” (of the physical universe, of humankind, or of civilizations); on the term “prehistoric” (after a creation event but before the origin of mankind versus after the origin of mankind but before documented history); and on the term “natural law” (in physics or in ethics).

      In at least one respect, Maimonides’ natural-law analysis has an advantage over Kant’s timeless-precept approach: Maimonides can explain why God held Cain immediately responsible for Abel’s death in prehistoric time, even though the written norm against murder would not be given until much later at Mt. Sinai.  According to Maimonides, the precept against murder already existed in Cain’s day and was, or should have been, ingrained (non-inferentially) in Cain’s conscience.  In contrast, it would seem to have been too onerous a Kantian requirement to expect that Cain should have been able to perform the world’s first “universalization of subjective maxim” (a particular kind of inference) in order to ascertain de novo that murder is illicit.

      Kant’s impressive account of the timeless source of moral obligation implies that moral reasoning is available to all rational agents in a secular universe.  This reasoning is based on the universalization of subjective maxims and is analogous to the Biblical account of the “Golden Rule.”  In contrast, for Maimonides, natural law seems to appear in time in a way that is only accidentally amenable to mankind’s rational faculties and that could elude the faculties of hypothetical rational agents on a distant exoplanet.

      The concept of timelessness has served Kant less well in religion.  Kant seems to have implied that all revealed religions overlap a common domain representing a unique, timeless natural religion of reason (Vernunftreligion), which exists as an aid in motivating moral choices and as a part of the domain of pure reason.  (See the October 2019 posting to this blog.)  This natural religion of reason, if it exists, is available to all introspective, rational agents.  But as a matter of historical record among the world’s revealed religions, it seems never to have occurred to any of the leaders of the non-Christian religions that there is any such real overlap.  Instead, this purported “natural religion of overlap” seems to be a watered-down version of Christianity that is credible only to some Deistic or Enlightenment thinkers in the West, or to their intellectual successors.  

      Kant’s timeless view of Vernunftreligion led him to some views that are distinctly unorthodox from the Christian perspective: While quoting from a minor Kantian text, T. M. Greene notes on p. LIX of his Introduction to Kant’s Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (Harper, 1960) that Kant considered resurrection to be unimportant, “for who is so fond of his body that he would wish to drag it about with him through all eternity if he could get by without it?”  It would seem to be more appropriate to say that religion has both transcendent (timeless) and immanent (historical) aspects.

Exploring the Coastline of Religious Experience

In last month’s blog posting, we noted that modernity, including Kant’s philosophy, sees thinking for oneself as a rejection of all tradition, even though systematic thinking itself seems to be a tradition.  Post-modernity sees modernity as a tradition that is unaware of its own status as a tradition.  On this view, modernity is either a dead end, because it and all other traditions have been discredited; or else one tenable tradition, among others, that advances some philosophical insights.

      As an exponent of modernity, Kant saw the many, traditional, revealed religions as potential sources of superstition but also as overlapping a common domain, or natural religion of reason.  For Kant, this Vernunftreligion exists as an aid in motivating moral choices, fulfilling the Categorical Imperative, and forming part of the philosopher’s proper domain of pure reason.  In contrast, Schleiermacher saw religion as based on a feeling (immediate self-consciousness) of complete dependence on the infinite.  In this Gefühlsreligion, the self feels itself to be dependent on some romantic totality. Vernunftreligion has the problem of inferring religious experience from purely rational experience, which seems too narrow.  Gefühlsreligion has the problem of differentiating religious experience from aesthetic consciousness, which seems too broad.  In either case, if one starts looking for God in one’s experience, then one may end up identifying one’s experience with God. 

      Kant’s coastline analogy in the Critique of Pure Reason (A396) is meant to distinguish empirical appearances from “things in themselves” and to confine the voyage of reason to the continuous coastline of experience.  Even allowing for this necessity, it is not clear that observations of “a coastline of religious experience” are sufficient for navigating between the Scylla and Charybdis of Vernunftreligion and Gefühlsreligion.  The triangulation of one’s position relative to a coastline requires not only multiple observations of known points on that coastline; not only a compass, a map, a parallel ruler, and a pencil; but also the presupposition that one’s predecessors received a reliable inspiration to create this technique and its tools.  Beyond empirical observations, what is required for distilling religious experience into religious doctrine?

      George Lindbeck (The Nature of Religious Doctrine, 1984, pp. 16-18) provided a suitably “beyond-ist” theory of religious doctrine.  If religious doctrines are thought of as purely symbolic expressions of religious experience, then one is espousing an experiential-expressive theory of religion.  This theory presupposes that some “individual genius,” perhaps one’s own, is added to experience in order to produce religious expressions.  On the other hand, Lindbeck believed that religious doctrines could be thought of as authoritative linguistic rules.  These rules are added to religious culture (experience, discourse, attitudes, and practices) in order to permit or exclude certain faith propositions, thereby creating a cultural-linguistic theory of religion.  This theory presupposes that some “cultural genius” has produced the required linguistic rules without compromising traditional propositional truth criteria.

      The experiential-expressive theory of religion is ideal for interpreting individual quests for personal meaning, because the theory has a clear starting part (the “turn to the subject”), and a clear ending point (a set of personalized religious beliefs, symbols, or doctrines).  Lindbeck (pp. 22-23) saw these theories as having extended from a post-Reformation world, with its many denominations of Christianity, to a post-Christian world, with its “multiple suppliers” of principles for organizing one’s inner experiences.  For the experiential-expressivist, all internal experiences are equally incontrovertible traces of the Ultimate; hence, all expressed religious beliefs are equally valid.

      Lindbeck’s Chapter 2 explores the extent to which the cultural-linguistic theory of religion finds support as the opposing thesis that religious doctrine plays a role in producing religious experience.  (Note that the cultural-linguistic theory only maintains that some knowledge of religious doctrine is logically prior to one’s assessment of his or her internal state, not that religious doctrine causes that internal state.)  On this account (pp. 33-41), religious doctrine is a cultural or linguistic framework (skill set) that helps shape one’s internal state (life and thought) instead of being only an expression of that internal state.  There are internal states (thoughts) that we cannot have unless we have an adequate language, consistent with Wittgenstein’s private language argument.  Becoming Christian involves learning Biblical stories and lessons well enough to facilitate the interpretation of one’s experience.  Hearing an external word helps shape experience and leads to faith. 

      Abandoning the notion that the exclusive source of religion is in prior experience is consistent with abandoning the notion that there is an inner experience of God common to all human beings and religions, but expressed differently (pp. 39-40).  On the cultural-linguistic theory, adherents of different religions have different experiences.  Lindbeck uses the example of Buddhist compassion, Christian love, and French-Revolutionary (quasi-religious) fraternité: These do not represent (express) a fundamental human awareness but are radically different ways of experiencing the cosmos.  On this view, religion is not something universal arising from the inmost depths of individuals, but is rather a class name for a set of diverse cultural-linguistic systems that help to shape the beliefs, attitudes, and sentiments of their adherents.  These cultural-linguistic systems help confine the voyage of reason to the continuous coastline of religious experience.

      (The next posting date for this blog is expected to be February 1, 2020.)

Kant, Sensus Communis, and Tradition

Common sense, or sensus communis, may refer to (1) a human individual’s “sixth sense” that organizes and unifies inputs from the five physical senses.  Common sense may also refer to (2) a widely distributed basic human awareness and ability to judge.  Descartes started his Discourse on Method with the observation that “Good sense is of all things the most equally distributed … The power of forming a good judgment and of distinguishing the true from the false, which is properly speaking what is called Good Sense or Reason, is by nature equal in all men.”  Finally, the sensus communis may refer to (3) the results of human judgments that exist in the form of viewpoints and values that are widespread within a particular linguistic or historical community.  For example, Herodotus spoke the common sense of his culture by memorializing the Greco-Persian Wars and ensuring that certain human achievements might neither be forgotten nor lose their glory.  Since viewpoints and values persist over a period of time and are inculcated into new generations while a community lasts, this third type of sensus communis may be said to form a tradition.  All three types of sensus communis play a role in creating the linguistic and intellectual environment required for philosophical analysis and synthesis.

      Did Kant think that humans possess any variety of sensus communis among their higher faculties?  If so, then is the Kantian sensus communis concerned with coordinating sensory input, as in (1); competence in judging, as in (2); or creation and evaluation of historical traditions, as in (3)?

      Regarding judgment: For Kant, sensible intuition serves as the basis for human thought about nature.  Objects given within consciousness (mental representations) arise from sensible matter (states of sense organs) and a priori sensible forms (space and time).  Only on a higher level of cognition does natural knowledge arise from the understanding (correct judgment) applied to sensible intuitions, mental representations, or given objects.  Regarding evaluation: Kant distinguishes between fulfilling hypothetical imperatives based on desire and obeying a Categorical Imperative based on a reverence for the moral law.  Thus, Kant believes that there are higher cognitive faculties related to understanding and moral evaluation that we could view as varieties of sensus communis.

      There is another Kantian higher faculty in which sensus communis plays a role: There exists an aesthetic faculty in which the imagination is applied to aesthetic intuitions (mental representations of a certain kind, i.e., aesthetic objects) in order to evaluate the subject’s feelings of pleasure or displeasure toward the aesthetic object.  The very first footnote in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (the first half of his Critique of Judgment) defines taste as the faculty of judging the beautiful.  Subsequently, in ¶ 1 of § 40 of that work, Kant says that although we may speak of senses of truth, beauty, or justice, etc. when referring to one’s dexterity in rendering judgments; we know full well that these concepts have no empirical basis but rather spring from (what we read as) “higher faculties.”  [Kant seems in this paragraph carelessly to have lumped together all higher faculties into a single Erkentnisvermögen (faculty of cognition), which would contradict his overall thesis, stated in § 1, that the judgment of taste is not a judgment of cognition.  (Das Geschmacksurteil ist also kein Erkenntnisurteil.)] 

      Continuing in ¶ 1 of § 40, Kant holds that common sense, interpreted as common human understanding (gemeiner Menschenverstand), may refer to “mere healthy understanding” (bloβ gesunder Menschenverstand); which is the least we can expect from a creature purporting to be human and which - - so far from being a positive distinction - - is actually a vulgar quality.  Kant disdains Reid’s approach to common sense.

      In ¶ 2 of § 40, however, Kant finds that gemeiner Verstand also bears the meaning gemeinschaftlicher Verstand, i.e., that common sense may refer to “public sense.”  Common sense as public sense refers a perfectly disinterested subject’s (i.e., “one’s”) act of reflective judgment (Reflexion): One takes into account the a priori form of representation of all others in order to conform one’s judgment to that of the totality of human reason, thereby avoiding the illusion that private considerations might prejudice the judgment.  This is accomplished by comparing one’s judgment not only to others’ actual judgments but also to others’ merely possible judgments, abstracting away from one’s own limitations.  Kant admits that the operation of reflection appears rather too artificial to be common, but insists that abstracting away from mere charm and emotion is necessary when rendering a universal judgment.  Nevertheless, it strikes the present writer that common sense as public sense involves more than just (2), the ability to judge aesthetic objects; and includes (3), the traditional results of judgments in particular communities in particular epochs.

      In an aside in ¶ 3 of § 40 Kant states three “maxims of common sense”: First, think for yourself.  Second, think from the standpoint of everyone else.  Third, think consistently at all times.  This is Kant’s formula for implementing the Enlightenment, blasting superstition and tradition, and restricting common sense to option (2) of our analysis.

      Kant says in ¶ 4 of § 40 that taste is more justifiably designated as sensus communis or public sense than is “healthy understanding.”  Aesthetic, rather than intellectual, judgment is the effect that mere reflection (bloβe Reflexion) has upon the mind; and this effect is a feeling of pleasure or displeasure.  Taste might even be defined as the faculty of judging what makes our feeling regarding a given representation universally communicable without the use of concepts.  In a footnote, Kant identifies taste with a sensus communis aestheticus, whereas gemeiner Verstand corresponds to a sensus communis logicus.

      In ¶ 5 of § 40 Kant reformulated the idea of mere reflection as the interaction between free imagination and understanding apart from concepts, resulting in the communication of an aesthetic representation (i.e., in an aesthetic representation communicating itself) as an internal feeling of a purposive state of mind, not as a thought.

      Regarding the perfectly disinterested subject (the “one”) who is tasked with assessing common sense as public sense in the foregoing discussion: Are Kant and his readers trying to achieve a “view from nowhere,” consistent with the work of Thomas Nagel?  His view is that achieving objective reality is a great good, but that objective reality is incomplete.  Alternately, do we seek to approximate a “view from everywhere,” an estimated totality of human reason that may likewise be incomplete?  Or are we looking for a “view from somewhere,” a land of particular traditions?

      Kant embodied the Enlightenment tradition of thinking for oneself, which in turn derived from the Cartesian paradigm of retiring to a mountaintop with one’s reason and good sense (sensus communis) in order to establish all knowledge for oneself based on the cogito ergo sum.  Modernity, including Kant’s philosophy, sees thinking for oneself as a rejection of all tradition, even though systematic thinking seems itself to be a tradition.  In some of his lectures, Professor Phillip Cary has pointed out that post-modernity sees modernity as a tradition that is unaware of its own status as a tradition.  On this view, modernity is either a dead end, because it and all other traditions have been discredited; or else one tenable tradition, among others, that has something to contribute to analysis and narration.  Modernity seems to be a sensus communis of type (3) as defined in the first paragraph of this post.

      Adopting one possible post-modern perspective, religions could be seen as interacting historical traditions in the quest for meaning.  As an exponent of modernity, however, Kant saw traditional, revealed religions as potential sources of superstition.  In terms of Venn diagrams, one imagines Kant depicting revealed religions as overlapping circles on a plane representing the “religious universe of discourse.”  Kant seems to have implied that all “revealed-religion circles” overlap a common, smaller region representing a unique, natural religion of reason.  For Kant, this Vernunftreligion exists as an aid in motivating moral choices, fulfilling the Categorical Imperative, and forming part of the philosopher’s proper domain of pure reason. (This view is adapted from the Preface to the second edition of Kant’s Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.)  Nevertheless, the possibility that modernity and its Vernunftreligion may themselves be Western traditions seems to loom over the Kantian project.